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HIGH-STAKES INTERPRETATION 
Ryan D. Doerfler* 
Courts look at text differently in high-stakes cases.  Statutory language that would otherwise be ‘unambiguous’ 
suddenly becomes ‘less than clear.’ This, in turn, frees up courts to sidestep constitutional conflicts, avoid 
dramatic policy changes, and, more generally, get around undesirable outcomes.  The standard account of this 
behavior is that courts’ failure to recognize ‘clear’ or ‘unambiguous’ meanings in such cases is motivated or 
disingenuous, and, at best, justified on instrumentalist grounds. 
This Article challenges that account.  It argues instead that, as a purely epistemic matter, it is more difficult 
to ‘know’ what a text means—and, hence, more difficult to regard that text as ‘clear’ or ‘unambiguous’—
when the practical stakes are raised.  For that reason, this Article insists, it is entirely rational for courts to be 
more cautious when interpreting text in high-stakes cases than they would be if the stakes were low.  Drawing 
on contemporary work in philosophy of language and epistemology, this Article grounds its argument in the 
observation that ordinary speakers’ willingness to attribute ‘knowledge’ or ‘clarity’ decreases as the practical 
stakes increase.  And while the technical explanations of this phenomenon vary, they all reflect a basic insight: 
that one needs greater epistemic justification to act on some premise the higher the practical stakes. 
To illustrate, this Article applies the above insight to various interpretive settings.  Considering judicial review, 
for example, this Article explains that it makes good epistemic sense for a court to wait until it is really sure 
that a statute means what it thinks it means before taking the extraordinary step of invalidating that statute 
as unconstitutional.  Similarly, this Article urges that it is just sound epistemic practice for a court is to construe 
a statute in a way that would unsettle an existing implementation regime only if it is especially well justified 
in its reading of the statutory text, i.e. only if it really knows that its reading is correct. 
This Article thus offers at least a partial justification of courts’ seemingly loose treatment of statutory text when 
the practical stakes are raised.  And it does so, in contrast to prior scholarly efforts, by appeal to reasons that 
both formalists and instrumentalists can accept. 
 
We’re all textualists now[, except in June]. 
— Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture, Harvard Law School 
(November 18, 2015) (alteration added) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“We must enforce plain and unambiguous statutory language according to its 
terms.”1  Courts recite such maxims again and again.2  And, in run-of-the-mill cases, 
                                                          
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Thanks to Hrafn Asgeirsson, 
William Baude, Mitchell Berman, Sophia Lee, Richard Re, and participants at the Law, Language, and 
Normativity Workshop at the Surrey Centre for Law and Philosophy for helpful comments and 
suggestions. 
1 Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010). 
2 See, e.g., Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016) (“[P]olicy arguments 
cannot supersede the clear statutory text.”); Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016) (“Statutory 
interpretation, as we always say, begins with the text. … [T]he statute speaks in unambiguous terms 
….”); Nichols v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1113, 1119 (2016) (“[E]ven the most formidable argument 
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they pretty much do as they say.  As John Manning has observed, gone are the days 
when courts would openly rewrite statutory language in the service of Congress’s 
apparent policy aims.3  More still, courts (somewhat) reliably give effect to “plain” or 
“clear” language, ostensible (or perhaps conceivable) practical downsides 
notwithstanding.4  All of this suggests a new consensus that courts should prioritize 
Congress’s specific instructions over its general policy ambitions—the reason being 
that those instructions are the best indication of “Congress’s specific choices about 
the means to carry [its policy] ends into effect.”5  Courts thus agree that a statute’s precise 
contribution to the law is (at a minimum) what Congress communicates through that 
statute precisely—at least, that is, where what Congress communicates is “clear.” 6 
Again, the above story does reasonably well with ordinary cases.  More 
worrisome is how it seems to fare when the practical stakes are raised.  As different 
scholars have noted, courts treat statutory text as more malleable in big cases.  When 
considering constitutional challenges, for example, courts frequently bend over 
backwards to avoid reading statutes in ways that would raise “serious constitutional 
doubts.”7  The result is the adoption of what Neal Katyal and Thomas Schmidt 
disparage as “tortured constructions of statutes … bear[ing] little resemblance to laws 
actually passed.”8  So too in cases involving non-constitutional ‘challenges’ to major 
                                                          
concerning the statute’s purposes could not overcome the clarity we find in the statute’s text.” (quoting 
Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S.Ct. 596, 607, n.4 (2012))); Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1895 (2013) (“Our 
‘inquiry ceases [in a statutory construction case] if the statutory language is unambiguous and the 
statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’” (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 
(2002)) (alteration in original))). 
3 John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 114 (2011) [hereinafter, Manning, The 
New Purposivism] (“[T]he Court in the last two decades has mostly treated as uncontroversial its duty to 
adhere strictly to the terms of a clear statutory text, even when doing so produces results that fit poorly 
with the apparent purposes that inspired the enactment.”); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 12 (2012) (observing that “Holy 
Trinity is a decision that the Supreme Court stopped relying on more than two decades ago”). 
4 See, e.g., Nichols, 136 S. Ct. at 1113; Cloer, 133 S. Ct. at 1886; Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 2034 (2012); Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (2011). 
5 Manning, The New Purposivism, supra note 3, at 115 (emphasis added); accord Ryan D. Doerfler, The 
Scrivener’s Error, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 811, 827-30 (2016) [hereinafter Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error]. 
6 This is, to be clear, a claim about our positive law of statutory interpretation.  See William Baude & 
Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079 (2017).  In principle, a statute’s 
contribution to the law could diverge sharply from its communicative content.  See Mark Greenberg, 
The Standard Picture and Its Discontents, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 39, 48 (Leslie 
Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011) (observing that the phrase “legal interpretation” is ambiguous between 
ascertaining the communicative content of a legal text and determining its legal significance).  This claim 
assumes also that the communicative content of the statute is not superseded by some other source of 
law (e.g., the Constitution).  See Hrafn Asgeirsson, Can Legal Practice Adjudicate Between Theories of 
Vagueness, in VAGUENESS AND THE LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 95, 103-04 (Ralf 
Poscher ed., 2016) (arguing that the communicative content of a statute is coextensive with its legal 
content absent some “rebutting” or “undercutting” source of law). 
7 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005); accord Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991); Edward 
J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). 
8 Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 
128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2112 (2015). 
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statutes,9 where courts—and, in particular, Chief Justice Roberts—are routinely 
criticized for “ignor[ing]” statutory text outright in an effort to uphold existing 
implementation regimes.10 
 So what to make of the disparity?  Is it just that courts stick to the text in low-
stakes cases but are textually unbound when it matters?11  Or, only slightly more 
charitably, is it that courts care about text only so much, and that, at some point, 
practical or institutional interests simply outweigh?  Something like this cynical (or 
semi-cynical) explanation is familiar, especially as the Supreme Court issues its late-
Term decisions.  Hence, Adrian Vermeule’s remark: “We have two Supreme Courts—
roughly, constrained legalism October through May, and then a free-for-all.”12 
More recently, a handful of scholars have offered limited justifications of the 
disparity, ultimately on instrumentalist grounds.  Richard Re, for instance, has 
suggested that judges consistently adhere to “clear” text, but that, for some, “purposive 
and pragmatic considerations” partially determine just how clear a text needs to be to 
command respect.13  Re’s explanation is that “when a statute’s central objective is at 
risk or an otherwise plausible reading leads to alarming results,” it only makes sense to 
“hold the text to a higher-than-normal standard.”14  Somewhat differently, Curtis 
Bradley and Neil Siegel have argued in the constitutional context that whether a text 
is perceived as “clear” or “ambiguous” depends in part on historical practice.15 
According to Bradley and Siegel, even if a text is “clear” at the time of enactment, 
subsequent activity to the contrary (e.g., a “[l]ong-settled and established practice”16 of 
congressional acquiescence) can actually render that text “ambiguous,” thereby freeing 
courts from textual constraint.17  In support of this striking claim, Bradely and Siegel 
                                                          
9 That is, cases in which a litigant advances an interpretation the acceptance of which would dramatically 
limit the practical effect of a statute relative to the existing implementation regime. 
10 George F. Will, On Obamacare, John Roberts helps overthrow the Constitution, WASH. POST (June 25, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/john-roberts-helps-overthrow-the-
constitution/2015/06/25/47d9ffde-1b67-11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html; see also Ilya Somin, 
How John Roberts Begat Donald Trump, THE FEDERALIST (May 5, 2016), 
http://thefederalist.com/2016/05/05/how-john-roberts-begat-donald-trump (attributing to the Chief 
Justice “contempt for the rule of law”). 
11 Cf. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. 
REV. 231 (arguing that ordinary meaning serves a coordinating function in low-stakes cases). 
12 Adrian Vermeule (@avermeule), TWITTER (June 27, 2016, 2:42 PM), 
https://twitter.com/avermeule/status/747515425764810752. 
13 Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2d 407, 417 (2015). 
14 Id. at 421. 
15 See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 
1213 (2015) [hereinafter Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint]; Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After 
Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1 
[hereinafter Bradley & Siegel, After Recess]. 
16 N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 
655, 689 (1929) (alteration in original)). 
17 See Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint, supra note 15, at 1287 (allowing that “the meaning of an 
otherwise clear numerical provision could become unclear” through subsequent practice). 
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cite practical and institutional interests, claiming, for example, that crediting historical 
practice shows respect for coordinate branches and helps keep old texts up-to-date.18 
Both of the justifications of the high-stakes/low-stakes disparity just 
mentioned are limited in that each maps onto the high-stakes/low-stakes distinction 
only somewhat.  Re’s account, for example, predicts that courts will treat text more 
loosely if either pragmatic or purposive reasons19 cut against the otherwise “clear” 
meaning of the text.20  As such, that account would have it that, even in low-stakes cases, 
the presence of purposive reasons will result in more casual reading—a prediction that 
runs contrary to the pattern of judicial behavior observed at the outset.21  Bradley and 
Siegel’s account, by contrast, applies principally in high-stakes cases: The possible 
invalidation of a long-established practice will, after all, typically render a case high 
stakes.22  At the same time, the universe of high-stakes cases is plainly much larger than 
that of cases involving challenges to long-established practice (e.g., major cases 
involving recently enacted statutes or regulations), making that account incomplete.23 
More fundamentally, though, both Re’s and Bradley and Siegel’s accounts 
require that one accept the sort of instrumentalist reasoning that most proponents of 
careful statutory reading reject.  Re’s suggestion, for instance, that some texts be held 
to “higher-than-normal standard” sets off alarm bells for those for whom the role of 
a court when interpreting a statute is to determine what Congress meant by the words 
that it used.24  Similarly, Bradley and Siegel’s suggestion that texts need to be kept up-
to-date seems to run contrary to what Larry Solum calls the “fixation thesis,” i.e. the 
thesis that the meaning of a text is fixed at the time of enactment, a basic assumption 
of most any version of textualism.25 
 As an alternative, this Article contends that one can plausibly make sense of 
how courts handle text in high-stakes cases by appeal to epistemological considerations 
                                                          
18 E.g., Bradley & Siegel, After Recess, supra note 15, at 61-63. 
19 That is, reasons reflecting Congress’s apparent policy aims (e.g., to expand health insurance coverage, 
to curtail insider trading). 
20 Re, supra note 13, at 417. 
21 Re cites Yates v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1074 (2015), as an example of a low-stakes case in which 
purposive reasons overcome an otherwise “plain” textual meaning.  See Re, supra note 13, at 411-13.  As 
I have argued elsewhere, however, that assessment of Yates rests on a confused understanding of “plain” 
meaning.  See William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2805431. 
22 But see infra notes 125-133 and accompanying text (discussing Milner v. Dep’t of Navy 562 U.S. 562, 
580-81 (2011)). 
23 That is, incomplete as an explanation of the disparate treatment of text in high-/low-stakes cases.  To 
the extent that Bradley and Siegel set out to explain a subset of that phenomenon (or a distinct but 
overlapping phenomenon), it is no discredit to their account that it fails to explain in full the 
phenomenon under consideration here. 
24 Cf. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Under all the usual rules of 
interpretation, in short, the Government should lose this case.  But normal rules of interpretation seem 
always to yield to the overriding principle of the present Court: The Affordable Care Act must be 
saved.”). 
25 Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Solum, The Fixation Thesis]. 
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cognizable by formalists and instrumentalists alike.  The argument is as follows: To 
say that the meaning of a statute is “clear” or “plain” is, in effect, to say26 that one 
knows what that statute means.27  As numerous philosophers have observed, however, 
ordinary speakers attribute “knowledge”—and, in turn, “clarity”—more or less freely 
depending upon the practical stakes.28  In low-stakes situations, speakers are willing to 
concede that a person “knows” this or that given only a moderate level of justification: 
Suppose, for example, Jane has checked the train schedule, uses the train system with 
some regularity, and is in no particular rush; in that situation, it is plausible for Jane to 
say that she “knows” that the train will arrive at 7 AM as scheduled.  By contrast, if 
the practical stakes are high, speakers require greater justification before allowing that 
someone “knows” that same thing, holding constant that person’s evidence: If, say, 
Jane has the same evidence as above but absolutely cannot afford to be late, Jane’s 
claim to “know” that the train will arrive at 7 AM is more doubtful.29   
As this Article explains, philosophers differ in their technical explanations of 
the above phenomenon: some attribute it to the semantic connection between 
“knowledge” and action,30 others suggest that we mean different things by “know” in 
different practical contexts,31 and others still contend that it has to do not with 
semantics but with pragmatics—very roughly, what we imply, as opposed to what we say, 
when attributing “knowledge.”32  Technical disagreements notwithstanding, most 
agree, however, that this pattern of linguistic behavior reflects a basic insight 
concerning the relationship between epistemological and practical reason, namely that 
that one needs greater epistemic justification to act on some premise the higher the practical stakes.33 
 Applying that basic insight, this Article urges that courts’ seemingly loose 
treatment of statutory text in high-stakes cases is partially attributable to (or at least 
justified by) the heightened epistemological standards that apply in high-stakes 
settings.  Put more colloquially, because it is more difficult to “know” what statutes 
mean in high-stakes cases, it makes perfect sense that courts find “clear” or “plain” 
meaning less often.  And, as a result, courts will more often have license to resort to 
‘gap-filling,’ i.e. non-linguistic, measures in those cases.34  Consider cases involving 
                                                          
26 Or, possibly, convey. 
27 See Doerfler & Baude, supra note 21, at *8-9. 
28 See, e.g., KEITH DEROSE, THE CASE FOR CONTEXTUALISM (2009); Jessica Brown, Contextualism and 
Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres, 130 PHIL. STUD. 407 (2006); JASON STANLEY, KNOWLEDGE AND 
PRACTICAL INTERESTS (2005). 
29 See Stuart Cohen, Contextualism, Skepticism, and The Structure of Reasons, 13 PHIL. PERSPECTIVES 57, 58 
(1999) (offering an analogous example); see also infra Part II.A. 
30 See STANLEY, supra note 28. 
31 See DEROSE, supra note 28. 
32 See Brown, supra note 28. 
33 See, e.g., STANLEY, supra note 28, at 9. 
34 See, e.g., Baude & Sachs, supra note 6, at 1083 (“Yet we still have to decide the case.  We don’t keep 
fruitlessly hunting for a hidden meaning; but neither do we tell judges to fill the gap with whatever they 
think best.  Instead, we use law to displace our ordinary inquiries about meaning.”); Tun-Jen Chiang & 
Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 530, 537 (2013) 
(“[I]f a court chooses to follow the linguistic meaning of text, it must decide how to fill in the gaps 
when the linguistic meaning does not fully answer a legal dispute ....”). 
7 
 
constitutional challenges.  As Justice Brandeis observed, “The Court has frequently 
called attention to the ‘great gravity and delicacy’ of its function in passing upon the 
validity of an act of Congress.”35  As such, it comes as no surprise that courts require 
a great deal of epistemological justification before acting on the premise that a statute 
means X where reading the statute to mean X would raise serious constitutional 
concerns.  Because of the “gravity” of acting on that premise, it is, for the reasons 
articulated above, more difficult for courts to “know” that the statute means X in the 
context of an adjudication.  This, in turn, makes it more difficult in turn for courts to 
regard X as the statute’s “clear” or “plain” meaning. The range of “fairly possible” 
readings for that statute thus proves greater than it would absent the looming 
constitutional concern, in the sense the statute turns out, in that context, to admit of 
readings other than X.36  Readings that would otherwise be reasonably regarded as 
“tortured”37 thus become epistemologically available owed to the heightened practical 
stakes. 
 To be clear, to say that it is more difficult to “know” what a statute means in a 
high-stakes case is not to say that to do so is impossible.  To illustrate, this Article 
contrasts two relatively recent Supreme Court decisions: Bond v. United States38 and 
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder.39  In Bond, this Article argues, 
the Supreme Court relied explicitly upon the epistemological principle at issue here,40 
but did so in the service of a plainly implausible reading—plainly implausible even 
considering the heightened practical stakes of the case.  In Northwest Austin, by 
contrast, the Court’s reliance on that principle was implicit, but its prima facie strained 
reading of the statute at issue was one arguably made plausible by the raised stakes.  In 
comparing these two cases, this Article efforts to show that, even in high-stakes 
situations, courts remain at least somewhat textually constrained.  Further, the contrast 
is intended as a concession that some but not all of the observed disparity between 
high- and low-stakes cases might be justified on epistemological grounds. 
 In terms of which cases count as “high-stakes,” this Article takes no position 
except to say that a case is high stakes just in case it matters a great deal to the deciding 
court and to those to whom its opinion is addressed.41  For that reason, the arguments 
below depend in part on apparent subjective evaluation: only if it seems likely that the 
deciding court thinks that a case matters specially should one expect that court to 
proceed with the corresponding epistemic caution.  On the other hand, this Article 
                                                          
35 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
36 Id. 
37 Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 8, at 2112. 
38 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
39 557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
40 See 134 S. Ct. at 2090. 
41 Because judicial opinions are written for an audience, the implicit assessment of a case’s relative 
importance contained in an opinion must be presumed by deciding court to be shared by that audience, 
on pains of being an uncooperative interlocutor.  See Stefano Predelli, Painted Leaves, Context, and Semantic 
Analysis, 28 LING. & PHIL. 351, 365 (2005) (observing that successful communication depends upon 
agreement among conversational participants as to what “matters”) .  As such, it is not enough to render 
a case “high stakes” that it matters specially to the deciding court. 
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leaves open the possibility of objective critique: even if courts do (or don’t) regard 
some class of cases as high stakes, one can still argue they should (or shouldn’t). 
This Article has four Parts.  Part I considers prior explanations of the disparity 
between high-stakes and low-stakes interpretation.  Part II offers an alternative, 
epistemological explanation of that phenomenon, building upon the basic insight that 
the degree of epistemological justification required to act on a premise increases as do 
the practical stakes.  Part III applies that basic insight to uncontroversially high-stakes 
adjudicatory situations.  It also considers situations one might think should qualify as 
high-stakes—in particular, criminal adjudication—but that courts appear to regard as 
low-stakes, given the ease with which they identify “plain” or “unambiguous” 
meaning.  In so doing, it shows that the insight this Article leverages has critical as well 
as justificatory potential.  Last, Part IV considers the applicability of the Article’s thesis 
to constitutional interpretation.  As this Part observes, the inherently high-stakes 
nature of constitutional interpretation might seem to explain why courts treat 
constitutional text much more loosely than statutory text.  Be that as it may, this Part 
concedes that courts treat constitutional text so loosely in certain instances that it 
becomes fair to ask whether courts are engaged in constitutional interpretation at all.42 
 
I. PRIOR EXPLANATIONS 
 
 This Part discusses prior accounts of courts’ disparate treatment of text in 
high- and low-stakes cases.  Part I.A sets out the standard account of the disparity, 
according to which courts’ reluctance to identify “clear” or “unambiguous” meanings 
is either disingenuous or the product of motivated reasoning.  Part I.B examines a 
recent, non-cynical account that attributes the disparity to the rise of a new form of 
purposivism.  Part I.C borrows from constitutional law, considering the “historical 
gloss” approach to interpretation, pursuant to which post-enactment practice can 
render a previously “clear” text “unclear” (or vice versa).  As this Part argues, all of 
these accounts are limited in that each promises to justify at most a subset of high-
stakes decisions.  More still, the justifying reasons each account offers are ones that 
formalists—the strongest proponents of adherence to “clear” or “unambiguous” 
text—would reject. 
 
A. Cynicism 
 
 According to the standard, cynical account, courts are reluctant to identify 
“clear” or “unambiguous” meanings in high-stakes cases because the practical 
                                                          
42 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2015) 
(cataloging consensus ‘readings’ of constitutional provisions that are utterly at odds with the 
constitutional text). 
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concerns raised in those cases overwhelm any commitment to textual fidelity.  In its 
starkest form, the standard account has it that courts outright “ignore” statutory text 
in an effort to advance some political or institutional agenda.43  Or, in a slightly milder 
form, the suggestion is that such agendas skew courts’ perception of statutory text in 
high-stakes cases, causing them to fail to perceive “clear” or “unambiguous” meanings 
apparent to the unmotivated reader.  To the extent that the standard account is 
justificatory, it is so in virtue of the principle that ‘the [practical] ends justify the 
[interpretive] means.’  With, for example, the Paris Climate Agreement at stake, one 
might (might!) forgive courts for attending to text less carefully than normal.44 
 Proponents of the standard account include Neal Katyal and Thomas Schmidt, 
who, in a recent article, criticize the Roberts Court sharply for its treatment of statutory 
text in cases involving constitutional challenges.45  As explained above, the canon of 
constitutional avoidance in its modern form permits courts to reject the “most natural 
reading” of a statute46 if that reading would raise “serious constitutional questions.”47  
A court may, however, adopt a less-natural-but-also-less-constitutionally-doubtful 
reading only if that alternate reading is “fairly possible.”48  If, by contrast, the meaning 
of the challenged statute is “clear,” a court must accept it and address any 
constitutional questions directly.49 
Katyal and Schmidt argue that, through application of the avoidance canon, 
the Roberts Court has engaged in an aggressive campaign of judicial “rewriting” of 
statutes in constitutional cases, “usher[ing] in legal change” under the banner of 
judicial restraint.50  According Katyal and Schmidt, the Roberts Court has appeared 
“indifferent” to whether the statutory readings it adopts in constitutional cases are “at 
all plausible.”51  Instead, they continue, the Court has freely endorsed interpretations 
that are otherwise “unthinkable,” “abandon[ing] normal principles of statutory 
interpretation whenever a serious constitutional issue looms.”52  The result is that the 
Court “leaves in place … law[s] that Congress never passed and may never have 
wanted to pass,” a problem made all the worse by the reality of partisan gridlock and, 
                                                          
43 See supra note 10. 
44 See Why Insiders Think the EPA Got the Best of the Clean Power Plan Hearing Last Week, UTILITY DIVE 
(October 5, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/why-epa-got-the-best-of-the-clean-power-plan-
hearing/427657/ (quoting an attorney for petitioners challenging the Clean Power Plan: “I tend to agree 
that if you take all of the passion of climate change and the Paris agreement out, I think EPA loses 10-
0 … [b]ut there certainly seem to be some judges who were looking for a way to allow EPA to do 
something like this, and I think that’s hard to take out of the case.”). 
45 See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 8. 
46 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015); accord Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2600 (2012). 
47 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009). 
48 United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 92 (1985) (“[T]his Court will not pass on the constitutionality of 
an Act of Congress if a construction of the Act is fairly possible … by which the constitutional question 
can be avoided.”). 
49 Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 929–30 (1991). 
50 Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 8, at 2111-12. 
51 Id. at 2112. 
52 Id. at 2116. 
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hence, the implausibility of legislative override.53  Katyal and Schmidt allow that the 
Court’s motivations in these cases may be innocent, driven by, for example, a “desire 
for narrower rulings.”54  Be that as it may, Katyal and Schmidt insist that sometimes 
“distorting a statute in the name of avoidance does more violence to congressional 
intent—and is therefore more countermajoritarian—than outright invalidation.”55 
 Sounding a more optimistic note, Jonathan Adler characterizes the Roberts 
Court’s apparent loose treatment of text as an exercise of “Burkean minimalism.”56  
Like Katyal and Schmidt, Adler describes the Court as ignoring the “plain meaning” 
of statutory text in cases involving constitutional challenges, as well as cases involving 
non-constitutional challenges to major statutes.57  According to Alder, though, the 
Court’s “willing[ness] to stretch or massage relevant statutory provisions” in such cases 
reflects a desire to “avoid interpretations that would require invalidating federal 
statutes on constitutional grounds or would otherwise prove disruptive to the status 
quo.”58  In Adler’s view, the Court seems committed in these cases not only to 
respecting and deferring to the political branches—the traditional understanding of 
judicial minimalism—but also to “reducing the practical impact of [its] rulings.”59  
Drawing on Chief Justice Robert’s famous analogy between judges and umpires, Adler 
suggests that, in the Chief Justice’s view, a good judge, like a good umpire, is one who 
“avoid[s] making calls that control the outcome of the game.”60  And while Adler is 
careful not to endorse this understanding of judging,61 he does offer a prima facie 
justification for the Roberts Court’s “willing[ness] … to stretch statutory text,” namely 
the “avoid[ance of] disruptive consequences.”62 
 Needless to say, the justification that Adler highlights is both highly 
contestable and of limited appeal.  As Adler himself points out, “strain[ing]” to read 
text in ways that promote desirable outcomes—status-quo preserving or no—
threatens institutional legitimacy.63  In addition, as Katyal and Schmidt observe, efforts 
to minimize judicial impact can have unintended practical consequences.64  More 
fundamentally, whatever appeal this sort of practical justification has to 
                                                          
53 Id. at 2118-20. 
54 Id. at 2114. 
55 Id. at 2128. 
56 Jonathan H. Adler, Anti-Disruption Statutory Construction, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 101, 103 (2016). 
57 Id.; see also id. at 119-20 (“There is often room for reasonable people to differ on the best interpretation 
of a complex statute, but some of the Chief Justice’s opinions seem to stretch interpretive choices 
beyond their breaking point.”). 
58 Id. at 103. 
59 Id. at 105. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 119 (“The analysis presented here is descriptive, not normative.”). 
62 Id. at 120. 
63 Id. at 105. 
64 Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 8, at 2163 (observing that, by merely hinting at answers to constitutional 
questions via application of the avoidance canon, higher courts provide lower courts little guidance 
concerning how to handle similar challenges). 
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instrumentalists, formalists reject it out of hand.65  As mentioned above, any 
justification resulting from the standard, cynical (or semi-cynical) account must be of 
the ‘ends-justify-the-means’ variety.  And that sort of justification is, for the formalist, 
uncognizable per se. 
 
B. The New Holy Trinity 
 
  The cynical account has it that courts abandon interpretive principle in high-
stakes cases.66  Richard Re argues, by contrast, that interpretive principle has “evolved” 
in ways that helps explain the high-/low-stakes disparity.67  According to Re, although 
courts no longer “rewrite” statutory language openly in the service of Congress’s 
apparent policy aims, the Roberts Court in particular has come to assign significant 
weight to such aims—along with other pragmatic considerations—when determining 
“how much clarity is required for a text to be clear” and so to command a particular 
outcome.68  The result, Re continues, is a new form of purposivism, pursuant to which 
text constrains, but the degree to which it constrains depends upon nontextual 
factors.69  As Re explains it, “[i]f a reading has no textual support, then no amount of 
pragmatism or purpose can carry the day.”70  If, on the other hand, “a statute’s central 
objective is at risk or an otherwise plausible reading leads to alarming results,” then 
the approach requires overwhelming textual evidence for text to control—assuming, 
that is, some minimally textually plausible alternative.71  Re dubs this approach the 
“New Holy Trinity,”72 contrasting it with the old, open-rewriting brand of purposivism 
associated with the now-infamous Holy Trinity Church v. United States.73 
 Much like Adler, Re suggests that loose treatment of text in “unusual but 
pivotal” cases helps to avoid “shocking effects or disruptive consequences.”74  Unlike 
Adler, however, Re does his best to translate that justification into non-instrumentalist 
terms.  Re hypothesizes that, by holding text to a higher standard when a surprising or 
harmful result looms, courts are attempting to “adhere to clear text when it’s the 
product of deliberate compromise” but to set it aside “when it springs from an 
                                                          
65 Cf. Adler, supra note 56, at 103 (“Whatever the merits of this approach, it [i]s not textualism as we’ve 
come to know it.”). 
66 See id. (remarking that the Roberts Court’s “preference for limiting the disruptive impact of the Court’s 
decisions takes priority over any commitment to a particular interpretive technique”). 
67 Re, supra note 13, at 407; see also id. at 421 (suggesting that his account make sense of the difference 
between “banal” and “unusual but pivotal” cases). 
68 Id. at 417. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 421. 
72 Id. at 408. 
73 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and 
yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.”). 
74 Re, supra note 13, at 421. 
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inattentive mistake.”75  So articulated, Re’s defense of the New Holy Trinity mirrors the 
standard defense of the old doctrine that “judges may deviate from even the clearest 
statutory text when a given application would otherwise produce ‘absurd’ results”76— 
a doctrine associated, fittingly, with the old Holy Trinity.77  As Manning explains, the 
basic thought underlying the absurdity doctrine is that “legislators necessarily draft 
statutes within the constraints of bounded foresight, limited resources, and imperfect 
language.”78  For that reason, if a given statutory application is “absurd,” a court should 
“presume[] that this absurd result reflects imprecise drafting that Congress could and 
would have corrected had the issue come up during the enactment process.”79 
Because Re’s defense of the New Holy Trinity is familiar, so too is the basic 
objection.  It is, at this point, widely recognized that Congress legislates means as well 
as ends.  Enacting legislation (when it happens) requires compromise, and 
implementing compromise often requires adopting otherwise suboptimal means.80  As 
textualists have long argued, the most feasible way for Congress to identify specific 
means is for it to use specific words.81  For that reason, if courts treat precise statutory 
language as a mere “proxy” of Congress’s general policy aims, they make it infeasible 
for members of Congress to negotiate compromises with binding force.82  This is why 
there is now a consensus that courts must enforce “clear” statutory text.83  And, as 
Manning has argued, the reasons that support that consensus do not support an 
exception for cases in which enforcing “clear” text would entail an “absurd” practical 
outcome.84  It is, of course, entirely sensible for courts to consider the “absurdity” of 
a practical outcome as evidence against a particular reading of some text.85  But once, 
having taken that outcome into account, a court deems the corresponding reading 
“best” nonetheless, that court would exceed its authority by setting that reading aside, 
dismissing it as a mistake.86 
                                                          
75 Id. at 418. 
76 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003) [hereinafter Manning, The 
Absurdity Doctrine]. 
77 Id. at 2403. 
78 Id. at 2389. 
79 Id. at 2389-90. 
80 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 601 (2009) (Thomas, J, concurring in the judgment) (“[A] 
statute’s text might reflect a compromise between parties who wanted to pursue a particular goal to 
different extents.”); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994) (Stevens, J.) (“Statutes are 
seldom crafted to pursue a single goal, and compromises necessary to their enactment may require 
adopting means other than those that would most effectively pursue the main goal.”). 
81 Manning, The New Purposivism, supra note 3, at 116. 
82 Id. 
83 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
84 Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 76, at 2392 (“Following such a course would more often 
require judges to accept seemingly odd or awkward results in particular cases, but doing so would serve 
important systemic values implicit in the constitutional structure—legislative supremacy, the 
evenhanded application of statutes, respect for legislative compromise, and the conception of limited 
judicial power implicit in rationality review.”). 
85 See Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, supra note 5, at 833. 
86 That is, a substantive mistake, as opposed to a linguistic mistake.  See id. at 830-34. 
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 Unlike the old Holy Trinity, Re’s insists that courts may adopt an unnatural 
reading only if that reading has “non-frivolous textual support.”87  Be that as it may, 
what Re advocates is that courts reject a statute’s most natural reading on the grounds 
that Congress’s choice of language is more likely owed to “inattent[ion]” than to 
compromise.88  Re appears, in so doing, to suggest that courts treat precise statutory 
language as a mere “proxy” for purpose—so long, that is, as that language is anything 
less than crystal clear.  If that’s right, the New Holy Trinity thus threatens to undermine 
legislative bargains in just the same way as the old.  Although it is more limited in 
scope, the kind of damage caused is the same. 
 Another way of putting the objection is that the New Holy Trinity double-
counts legislative purpose.  Again, pursuant to the New Holy Trinity, courts consider 
Congress’s apparent policy aims when deciding “how much clarity is required” in order 
for text to control—if a text’s most natural reading runs contrary to purpose, that 
reading must be especially clear for courts to give it effect.89  The problem with tying 
“clarity” to purpose, however, is that contemporary courts already consider Congress’s 
apparent policy aims when determining a text’s most natural reading.  As Manning 
observes, in the bad old days, textualist judges were “literalists,” equating fidelity to 
text with enforcement of “ordinary” meaning.90  Over time, though, textualists came 
to recognize that language has meaning only in context, and so began to consider the 
practical setting when making sense of a particular text.91  In a slogan, textualists now 
accept that, to understand “what Congress is trying to say,” courts must have some 
grasp of “what Congress is trying to do.”92  But if courts now consider legislative 
purpose when figuring out how a statute is most naturally read, the question for Re 
becomes, why consider purpose again when deciding how clear that most natural 
reading must be to control? 
                                                          
87 Re, supra note 13, at 417. 
88 Id. at 418. 
89 Re, supra note 13, at 417. 
90 Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 76, at 2456.  At times, Re sounds as if he regards textualist 
judges as belong the old “plain meaning” school.  See, e.g., Re, supra note 13, at 421 (attributing to 
textualists the principle that “legal ambiguity must be discoverable in text alone”).  So understood, the 
double-counting problem articulated above disappears.  It does so, however, only at the cost of 
rendering Re’s opponent an anachronism. 
91 To illustrate, Manning considers Puffendorf’s classic example of a statute imposing criminal penalties 
on any person who “drew blood in the streets.”  Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 76, at 2461 
(quoting United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 (1868)).  Puffendorf concluded, quite sensibly, 
that the statute should not extend to a surgeon who opened the vein of a person in the street felled by 
a seizure.  As Manning observes, for the old “plain meaning” textualist, Puffendorf’s conclusion is 
awkward since, “[r]ead literally,” that statute seemingly extends to the surgeon.  Id.  For the contextualist, 
by contrast, that sensible conclusion is straightforwardly available.  See id. (observing that, for example, 
as used “in the criminal code, one might expect the term ‘drew blood’ to describe a violent act”).  For 
extensive discussions of the ways in which context informs textual interpretation within a textualist 
framework, see also Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 979, 986-98 (2017) 
[hereinafter Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?] (cataloging examples). 
92 Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, supra note 91, at 981. 
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 A second objection, already mentioned, is that Re’s account predicts loose 
treatment of text even in cases with low practical stakes.93  Again, according to Re, 
courts’ treat text more loosely when purposive considerations cut against.94  This, in 
turn, suggests that courts will read text ‘creatively’ even in low-stakes cases so long as 
Congress’s apparent purpose runs contrary to a statute’s most straightforward reading.  
As indicated above, that prediction appears inconsistent with judicial behavior in 
recent years.95 
 Both of the objections above pertain to what one might call the “purposive” 
branch of the New Holy Trinity, i.e. the claim that, where a text’s most natural reading 
runs contrary to Congress’s apparent policy aims, a heightened standard of clarity goes 
into effect.  This leaves the proposal’s “pragmatic” branch, i.e. the analogous claim as 
to dramatic practical consequences.  For reasons articulated below, there is something 
fundamentally correct about the pragmatic branch of the New Holy Trinity, even if it is 
not fully theorized—as explained below, the justification for such a doctrine has not 
to do with risk of Congressional mistake, but rather judicial mistake.96  If one were to 
rid the proposal of its purposive branch, one could thus conceive of the New Holy 
Trinity less as an alternative to the account offered here than as an early predecessor to 
it. 
 
C. Constructed Constraint 
 
 In constitutional law, a popular claim as of late is that post-enactment practice 
can render constitutional text clearer or—more controversially—less clear.97  
Sometimes termed the “historical gloss” approach to interpretation, in a nod to Justice 
Frankfurter’s famous opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,98 the motivating 
thought is that the “perceived clarity or ambiguity” of some text is attributable not just 
to considerations having to do with linguistic meaning (e.g., ordinary usage, apparent 
purpose), but also to non-linguistic considerations such as, for example, congressional 
acquiescence to executive action or steady judicial enforcement.99  So conceived, 
“textual clarity is not just some linguistic fact of the matter that exists apart from the 
overall process” of constitutional implementation.100  Rather, “the clarity and 
                                                          
93 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
94 See Re, supra note 13, at 409 
95 See supra note 4 (collecting cases). 
96 See infra Part II. 
97 See, e.g., Bradely & Siegel, After Recess, supra note 15; Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint, supra note 
15; William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation (manuscript, copy on file with author). 
98 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
99 Bradley & Siegel, After Recess, supra note 15, at 44. 
100 Id. at 44-45. 
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ambiguity of the constitutional text is,” as Bradley and Siegel put it, “partially 
constructed” by subsequent practice.101  
As one example, Bradley and Siegel cite the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning.102  In that case, one question before the Court was whether 
the Recess Appointments Clause, which authorizes the President to fill up any 
vacancies that “may happen during” a Senate recess, encompasses vacancies that come 
into existence prior to the recess at issue. 103  As Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, 
conceded, the “most natural” reading of that language is as limiting the recess 
appointment power to vacancies that come into existence during the relevant recess.104  
At the same time, Justice Breyer continued, the Clause’s language at least “permits” a 
“broader interpretation” according to which vacancies that arise before but persist into 
the recess are included within the President’s power105—an interpretation, Justice 
Breyer went on to argue, more consonant with the Clause’s “purpose.”106  As evidence 
of the Clause’s “ambigu[ity],” Justice Breyer appealed to the longstanding executive 
branch practice of reading that language expansively.107  In dissent, Justice Scalia 
contested the linguistic availability of the majority’s interpretation, maintaining that 
“no reasonable reader” would have understood the Clause’s language as the majority 
suggested.108  According to Justice Scalia, to use those words to achieve that end would 
have been “surpassingly odd,” in particular given the “read[y] availab[ility]” of 
“alternate phrasings” that would have “convey[ed] that meaning clearly.”109  As to 
executive branch practice, Justice Scalia went on to observe that appointments for 
vacancies coming into existence prior to the recess at issue became common only 
                                                          
101 Id. at 45.  Bradley and Siegel contrast the “historical gloss” approach to the idea of “constitutional 
liquidation,” according to which uncertainties  about constitutional meaning would be “worked out, or 
‘liquidated,’ through decisions and practices.”  “Once liquidated,” according to Bradley and Siegel, “the 
meaning of the Constitution on those questions would become ‘fixed’ and so not subject to change.”  
Id. at 30-31; but see Baude, supra note 97, at *34-48 (arguing that liquidation correctly understood does 
not require that “liquidated” meanings be permanently “fixed”). 
102 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
103 U.S. CONST, Art II, § 2, cl 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen 
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next 
Session.”). 
104 Id. at 2567; see also Ryan D. Doerfler, Go Big or Go Home: The Constitutionality of Recess Appointments 
Following Pro Forma Sessions of the Senate, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 975, 980-88 (2013) (providing a linguistic 
analysis of this portion of the Recess Appointments Clause). 
105 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2567-68. 
106 Id. at 2568 (“The Clause’s purpose strongly supports the broader interpretation.  That purpose is to 
permit the President to obtain the assistance of subordinate officers when the Senate, due to its recess, 
cannot confirm them.”). 
107 Id. at 2567-68 (noting, e.g., that “Attorney General William Wirt advised President Monroe to follow 
the broader interpretation”); see also id. at 2570 (contending that “[h]istorical practice over the past 200 
years strongly favors the broader interpretation”). 
108 Id. at 2606 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
109 Id. at 2606-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (remarking that “the reasonable reader might have wondered, 
why would any intelligent drafter intending the majority’s reading” have used language contained in the 
Clause, thereby making that reading “awkward and unnatural”). 
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around the mid-nineteenth century, and only after a great deal of contestation within 
the executive branch.110 
Characterizing the dispute between Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia, Bradley 
and Siegel observe that both accept that “historical practice might be relevant” to 
constitutional interpretation, but only if “the constitutional text is ambiguous.”111  For 
Justice Scalia, the text of the Recess Appointments Clause was “clear,” making post-
enactment practice largely irrelevant.112  For Justice Breyer, by contrast, the text of the 
Clause was “ambiguous,” thus giving historical practice “significant weight.”113  
According to Bradley and Siegel, this difference in perception of textual clarity is at 
least partially attributable to a difference in which considerations each thought relevant 
to the question of whether text is “clear.”  For Justice Scalia, the clarity of the text was 
shown mostly if not entirely by appeal to linguistic considerations such as ordinary 
usage114—characteristic, as Bradley and Siegel observe, of originalist approaches to 
constitutional interpretation.115  For Justice Breyer, on the other hand, the reason—
indeed, the “only reason”—for “s[eeking] out a possible reading” beyond the deemed 
“most natural” was, seemingly, the longstanding historical practice of acting contrary 
to that “most natural” reading.116  As such, the language of the Recess Appointments 
Clause was actually made ambiguous, claim Bradley and Siegel, by that historical 
practice.117 
However it fares as an approach to constitutional interpretation,118 “historical 
gloss” has ready appeal when it comes to statutes.  If, for example, Adler is right that 
the Court has a bias in favor of the status quo,119 one way to make sense of that ‘bias’ 
is as an application of “historical gloss.”  Applying that framework, one could say the 
                                                          
110 Id. at 2610-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
111 Bradley & Siegel, After Recess, supra note 15, at 18. 
112 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2617 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Irrelevant, that is, insofar as historical practice 
is evidence of something other than the original public meaning of the Clause’s language.  See, e.g.,  Vasan 
Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. 
L.J. 1113, 1164-76 (2003) (discussing the (in their view, limited) probative value of early congressional, 
executive, and judicial precedents to the original public meaning of the constitutional text). 
113 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2559, 2568. 
114 See id. at 2606-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the “plain meaning” of the language at issue).  As 
Bradley and Siegel observe, Justice Scalia also appears moved by what he perceives as the “purpose” of 
the Recess Appointments Clause.  See Bradley & Siegel, After Recess, supra note 15, at 48-49.  As I have 
argued elsewhere, however, a drafter’s apparent purpose is a quintessentially linguistic consideration.  See 
Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Works?, supra note 91, at 995-98. 
115 See Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint, supra note 15, at 1241 (observing that for most originalists, 
non-linguistic considerations such as historical practice are relevant only if, on the basis of linguistic 
considerations, the constitutional text is unclear); see also id. at 1241 (observing that originalists “are likely 
to accept [pre-ratification practice] but not [post-ratification practice] as relevant to textual 
interpretation, especially if the postratification practice occurs long after the Founding”).  
116 Bradley & Siegel, After Recess, supra note 15, at 47-48. 
117 Id. at 47 (“[T]he Court’s finding of ambiguity for the phrase ‘vacancies that may happen’ suggests 
substantial extratextual construction”); see also Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint, supra note 15, at 
1266. 
118 See infra Part IV. 
119 See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text. 
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Court perceives otherwise “clear” text as “ambiguous” in the cases Adler cites precisely 
because the “most natural reading” of the text in those cases would, if accepted, be 
disruptive of, for example, the existing implementation regime.  So understood, it is 
not that the Court pretends to see “ambiguity” to avoid a disruptive result.  Rather, it 
is that the specter of disruption “constructs” unclarity where none existed before.120 
Despite its appeal, “historical gloss” also has serious limitations in terms of 
explaining the high-/low-stakes disparity in statutory interpretation.121  First and most 
obvious, even if some high-stakes cases are plausibly situated within the “historical 
gloss” framework, others are plainly not.  As discussed below, cases involving non-
constitutional challenges to major statutes are, for example, uncontroversially ‘high-
stakes.’122  Some of those cases involve challenges to longstanding implementation 
regimes and thus fit squarely within the “historical gloss” approach.123  Others such 
cases, however, involve what are more or less preemptive strikes.124  And while a 
nascent implementation regime is plausibly a “gloss” on the corresponding statutory 
text, a historical gloss it is not. 
Second, much like Re’s account, the “historical gloss” approach would seem 
to predict loose treatment of text if a text’s “most natural” reading is contrary to settled 
post-enactment practice, regardless of the practical stakes.  Again, that prediction 
appears incorrect.  In Milner v. Navy,125 for instance, the Supreme Court considered 
whether the Navy could invoke the Freedom of Information Act’s (FOIA’s) 
exemption for an agency’s “personnel rules and practices” to withhold internal maps 
pertaining to the storage of munitions.126  Below, the Ninth Circuit held that it could, 
reasoning that the maps in question related to “predominantly internal” matters the 
disclosure of which “presents a risk of circumvention of agency regulation.”127  In so 
holding, the Ninth Circuit applied a test articulated almost three decades earlier by the 
D.C. Circuit128—a test, according to Justice Breyer, “consistently followed, or 
favorably cited, by every Court of Appeals to have considered the matter during the 
                                                          
120  See Strauss, supra note 42, at 28 (“If an agency has consistently adhered to a view that seems to be at 
odds with the text of the statute, that might persuade a court to find a degree of vagueness or ambiguity 
in the text that the court would otherwise not perceive and to defer to the agency's longstanding view.”). 
121 Again, this is no discredit to the proponents of the “historical gloss” approach in the area of 
constitutional interpretation.  The purpose of this Part is to explore a potentially helpful analogy, not to 
impute to the authors discussed the intention to explain areas of interpretation other than the one they 
address explicitly. 
122 See infra Part III.B. 
123 See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities 
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015)). 
124 See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015)). 
125 562 U.S. 562 (2011). 
126 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2). 
127 Milner v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 575 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Milner 
v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (2011). 
128 See Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc) 
abrogated by Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (2011).  The D.C. Circuit grounded its broad reading 
of the exemption in FOIA’s “secondary purpose” of “preserving the effective operation of 
governmental agencies.”  Id. at 1070. 
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past 30 years.”129  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “the plain meaning of the 
term ‘personnel rules and practices,’ encompasses only records relating to issues of 
employee relations and human resources,” and so excludes maps of explosives.130  
Rejecting the more expansive reading of the relevant exemption, the Court insisted 
that to accept the D.C. Circuit’s reading would require it to “flout all usual rules of 
statutory interpretation.”131  The Court continued that it had “no warrant to ignore 
clear statutory language on the ground that other courts have done so.”132  The Court 
concluded by observing that “the Government has other tools at hand to shield 
national security information and other sensitive materials,” in particular other 
exemptions within FOIA.133  For that reason, the Court’s decision was likely of limited 
practical significance.  This despite its invalidating a (relatively) settled interpretive 
practice. 
Third, the appeal of “historical gloss” is limited insofar as it is fundamentally 
at odds with familiar formalist approaches to interpretation.  Again, Bradly and Siegel 
rightly contrast the “historical gloss” approach with “originalist” and “texualist” 
methods of interpretation.134  Pursuant to those methods, what a text means turns 
exclusively on linguistic considerations.135  By contrast, “historical gloss” grounds 
textual meaning in decidedly non-linguistic considerations, in particular political 
branch practice not at all proximate to the enactment of the corresponding text.  For 
that reason, “historical gloss” also involves a rejection of the “fixation thesis,” a basic 
premise of most any originalist or textualist theory.136  If, for example, historical 
practice contrary to a text’s “most natural” reading becomes sufficiently settled, the 
meaning of that text might flip, such that the ‘unnatural’ reading becomes “clear.”137  
According to Bradley and Siegel, this surprising implication is a feature of the 
“historical gloss” approach, not a bug.  The reason is that it facilitates textual 
“updating,” permitting legal texts “to evolve in response to … changing needs.”138  
                                                          
129 Milner, 562 U.S. at 585 (Breyer, J., dissenting); but see id. at 576 (Kagan, J.) (observing that “[p]rior to 
Crooker, three Circuits adopted the reading of [the exemption] we think right, and they have not changed 
their minds”). 
130 Id. at 581. 
131 Id. at 577. 
132 Id. at 576. 
133 Id. at 580-81. 
134 Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint, supra note 15, at 1216-17, 1241. 
135 Such methods often do permit consideration of non-linguistic considerations to fill gaps in textual 
meaning.  See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
453 (2013) (distinguishing constitutional “interpretation,” i.e. “the activity that discovers the 
communicative content or linguistic meaning of the constitutional text,” from constitutional 
“construction,” i.e. “the activity that determines the legal effect given the text,” observing that “the 
actual text of the U.S. Constitution contains general, abstract, and vague provisions that require 
constitutional construction that goes beyond the meaning of the text for their application to concrete 
constitutional cases”). 
136 See Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 25. 
137 Perhaps the best example Bradley and Siegel provide is the consensus that the First Amendment’s 
instruction that “Congress shall make no law . . . [e.g.,] abridging the freedom of speech,” U.S. CONST. 
amen. I, applies not just to Congress but to all branches of the federal government.  See Bradley & 
Siegel, Constructed Constraint, supra note 15, at 1243-47; but see infra Part IV. 
138 Bradley & Siegel, After Recess, supra note 15, at 63. 
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Needless to say, such “updating” is anathema to constitutional or statutory formalists, 
for whom Article V139 and Article I, § 7140 are, respectively, of the utmost 
importance.141 
 
II. HIGH/LOW STAKES 
 
This Article’s working hypothesis is that to say that it is “clear” (or “plain” or 
“unambiguous”) that something is the case is, roughly speaking, to claim that one is in 
an epistemic position to “know” it.142  Various linguistic data support this hypothesis.  
Like claims about “knowledge,” claims about “clarity” appear to be factive, i.e. truth-
entailing.143  In addition, claims about “clarity” and claims about “knowledge” seem to 
be mutually warranting, i.e. if one is warranted in claiming that something is “clear,” one 
is warranted in claiming to “know” it, and vice versa.144 
 Building on the above hypothesis, this Part articulates an alternate, 
epistemological explanation/justification of courts’ disparate treatment of text in high- 
and low-stakes cases.  Drawing on contemporary work in philosophy of language and 
epistemology, it argues that courts’ hesitancy to identify “clear” or “plain” statutory 
meaning in high-stakes cases is plausibly an instantiation of the more general 
reluctance on the part of ordinary speakers to claim to “know” things when the 
practical stakes are raised.  As this Part goes onto explain, this general reluctance on 
the part of speakers reflects a basic insight concerning the relationship between 
epistemic and practical reason, specifically that the epistemological justification 
required to act on some premise increases as do the practical stakes. 
 
                                                          
139 U.S. Const. art. V (establishing formal procedures for amending the Constitution). 
140 U.S. Const. art. I, § 7 (establishing formal procedures for enacting legislation). 
141 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 714 (1997) 
(discussing the importance of bicameralism and presentment); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser 
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989) (emphasizing the value of the “long and hard consideration 
required for a constitutional amendment”). 
142 Unlike claims about “knowledge” (e.g., “X knows that p.”), claims about “clarity” are typically 
impersonal (e.g., “It is clear that p.”).  As such, claims about “clarity” appear to be indexed to a particular 
body evidence (e.g., “It is clear (given the available evidence) that p.”).  In turn, claims about clarity 
seem to imply that those in the conversational circle have access to that body of evidence and so are in 
a position to “know” the proposition at issue. 
143 E.g., if I “know” that Oswald killed Kennedy, then Oswald in fact killed Kennedy.  The same is true 
if it is “clear” that Oswald killed Kennedy. 
144 The best evidence of mutual warrant is, perhaps, the infelicity of claiming to “know” something 
while denying that it is “clear,” or vice versa (“#” indicates infelicity): 
 # (A) I know that Oswald killed Kennedy, but it isn’t clear that he did. 
 # (B) It is clear that Oswald killed Kennedy, but I don’t know that he did. 
For reasons below, this Article takes no position as to whether such claims are mutually entailing. 
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A. Motivating Examples 
 
 In recent years, philosophers have offered various technical explanations of 
the relationship between the practical stakes of a situation and the use of certain 
epistemological predicates.  In particular, a great deal of work has gone into making 
sense of the effect changing the practical stakes has on speakers’ willingness to claim 
to “know” things.  This work has been motivated largely by a handful of intuitive, 
everyday examples that suggest the appropriateness of “knowledge” attributions vary 
according to the practical circumstances.145  Perhaps the best-known of these examples 
are the so-called Bank Cases, imagined by Keith DeRose: 
[LOW STAKES]: My wife and I are driving home on a Friday 
afternoon.  We plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit 
our paychecks.  But as we drive past the bank, we notice that the lines 
inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons.  Although 
we generally like to deposit our paychecks as soon as possible, it is not 
especially important in this case that they be deposited right away, so I 
suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our paychecks on 
Saturday morning.  My wife says, “Maybe the bank won’t be open 
tomorrow.  Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.”  I reply, “No, I 
know it’ll be open.  I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday.  It’s 
open until noon.” 
[HIGH STAKES]: My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday 
afternoon, as in [LOW STAKES], and notice the long lines.  I again 
suggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning, explaining 
that I was at the bank on Saturday morning only two weeks ago and 
discovered that it was open until noon.  But in this case, we have just 
written a very large and very important check.  If our paychecks are 
not deposited into our checking account before Monday morning, the 
important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad 
situation.  And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday.  My wife 
reminds me of these facts.  She then says, “Banks do change their 
hours.  Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?”  Remaining 
as confident as I was before that the bank will be open then, still, I 
reply, “Well, no.  I’d better go in and make sure.”146 
                                                          
145 A further motivation is that varying the epistemic standards required to “know” something according 
to the practical circumstances has seemed to many a promising approach to solving various skeptical 
puzzles.  See, e.g., DEROSE, supra note 28, at 41-43. 
146 Keith DeRose, Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions, 52 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 913, 
913 (1992).  The other well-known motivating example is Stuart Cohen’s so-called Airport Case: 
AIRPORT: Mary and John are at the L.A. airport contemplating taking a certain 
flight to New York.  They want to know whether the flight has a layover in Chicago.   
They overhear someone ask a passenger Smith if he knows whether the flight stops 
in Chicago.  Smith looks at the flight itinerary he got from the travel agent and 
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The Bank Cases are noteworthy in that they suggest that the appropriateness of 
claiming to “know” something can vary with the practical stakes, holding constant the 
considerations that bear on the truth or falsity of the proposition at issue (e.g., the 
available evidence).147  In LOW STAKES, it seems appropriate for the speaker to claim 
to “know” that the bank will be open on Saturday on the basis of his recent experience.  
In HIGH STAKES, by contrast, it seems appropriate for the speaker to refrain from 
claiming to “know” that the bank will be open.  The speaker’s evidence concerning 
whether the bank will be open on Saturday is the same in each case.  The only 
difference, seemingly, is that the practical consequences of mistakenly acting as if the 
bank will be open on Saturday are much greater in HIGH STAKES (e.g., a bounced 
check) than in LOW STAKES. 
 Because of the seeming connection between claiming that something is “clear” 
and claiming to “know” that thing, analogous examples can, unsurprisingly, be 
constructed for ascriptions of “clarity.”  For instance: 
ORDINARY: My wife and I are driving home on the evening of the 
New Hampshire primary.  We plan to stop at the polling place on the 
way home to cast our votes.  But as we drive past the place, we notice 
that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on the day of the 
primary.  Although we generally like to vote, it is not especially 
important in this case that we do so.  All of the candidates seem 
unremarkable, and all have similar policy platforms.  For these reasons, 
I suggest that we drive straight home, trusting that our preferred 
candidate will prevail.  My wife says, “Maybe she won’t win.  Lots of 
times turnout is the deciding factor.”  I reply, “No, it’s clear she’ll win.  
I checked the polls just a few days ago.  She’s comfortably ahead.”  
TRANSFORMATIVE: My wife and I drive past the polling place, as 
in ORDINARY, and notice the long lines.  I again suggest that we 
drive straight home, explaining that I checked the polls a few days ago 
and that our preferred candidate is ahead.  But in this case, the 
candidate we prefer is markedly different from the other candidates, 
potentially a transformative figure.  If she wins, her candidacy will gain 
immediate legitimacy, opening the door to a new era of American 
politics.  My wife reminds me of these facts.  She then says, “As you 
know, polls are wrong sometimes.  Is it clear that she will win?”  
                                                          
respond, ‘Yes I know—it does stop in Chicago.’  It turns out that Mary and John 
have a very important business contact they have to make at the Chicago airport. 
Mary says, ‘How reliable is that itinerary?  It could contain a misprint. They could 
have changed the schedule at the last minute.’  Mary and John agree that Smith 
doesn’t really know that the plane will stop in Chicago.  They decide to check with 
the airline agent. 
Cohen, supra note 29, at 58. 
147 More generally, cases of this sort suggest varying appropriateness of knowledge attributions, i.e. claims 
of the form “X knows that p.” 
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Remaining as confident as I was before that our preferred candidate 
will win, still, I reply, “Well, no.  We’d better go in and vote just to be 
safe.” 
Like the Bank Cases, these cases suggest that the appropriateness of claiming that 
something is “clear” can vary with the practical stakes.  In each case, the speaker’s 
evidence concerning whether the preferred candidate will win regardless is the same.  
Be that as it may, because the practical consequences of mistakenly acting as if the 
preferred candidate will win are much lesser in ORDINARY than in 
TRANSFORMATIVE, it seems appropriate for the speaker to claim that the election 
outcome is “clear” in the former case but not in the latter. 
 
B. Technical Explanations 
 
 Again, technical explanations of the examples discussed in Part II.A vary 
(readers uninterested in the details of the various candidate explanations should skip 
to Part II.C).  DeRose and other so-called contextualists argue that such examples show 
that attributions of “knowledge” are context-sensitive in that utterances of the form 
“X knows that p” express different propositions in different contexts of use.148 
So characterized, attributions of “knowledge” are much like attributions of 
“tallness” or “flatness.”149  The same person, for instance, might be fairly characterized 
as “tall” in a conversation about gymnastics, but not in a conversation about basketball.  
The standard explanation is that to characterize someone as “tall” is to say that that 
person is tall relative to some comparison class determined by the context of use.  In 
a conversation about gymnastics, to utter the sentence “Karen is tall” is to say, very 
roughly, that Karen is tall in relation to other gymnasts.  By contrast, to utter the same 
sentence in a conversation about basketball is to claim, again roughly, that Karen is tall 
in relation to other basketball players. 
Turning back to “know,” contextualists claim that the proposition expressed 
by uttering a sentence of the form “X knows that p” depends upon the practical stake 
the conversational participants have in the truth of p.  In a low-stakes situation, i.e. a 
situation in which the truth of p matters not very much to the participants, to say that 
one “knows that p” is to claim something like that one knows that p in a weak sense, i.e. 
in relation to a moderately demanding epistemic standard.150  By contrast, to utter that 
same sentence in a high-stakes situation, i.e. a situation in which the truth of p matters 
                                                          
148 See generally DEROSE, supra note 28. 
149 Contextualists also analogize “know” to familiar indexicals such as “I,” “here,” and “now.”  See, e.g., 
Stewart Cohen, How to be a Fallibilist, 2 PHIL. PERSPECTIVES 91, 97 (1988). 
150 An alternative gloss is that practical circumstances determine which possibilities are salient and so 
which possibilities need to be ruled out in order to “know” something.  See Stewart Cohen, Contextualist 
Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery, 76 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL.  289, 294-
95 (1998). 
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a great deal to the participants, is to claim that one knows that p in a strong sense, i.e. in 
relation to a very demanding epistemic standard.  Hence, in LOW STAKES, the 
speaker is in a position to claim to “know” that the bank will be open on Saturday 
because the evidence available to him satisfies a moderately demanding epistemic 
standard.  By contrast, because that same evidence does not satisfy a very demanding 
epistemic standard, the speaker in HIGH STAKES reasonably refrains from claiming 
to “know” that the bank will be open. 
A second explanation, defended by so-called interest-relative invariantists such as 
Jason Stanley, is that utterances of the form “X knows that p” express the same 
proposition regardless of the practical stakes: that X knows that p.151  At the same time, 
whether X knows that p depends, according to such authors, not just upon familiar 
considerations such as X’s evidence concerning p or whether p is true, but also, quite 
unconventionally, on X’s practical stake in the truth of p.  As Stanley puts it, “[t]he 
basic idea is that, the greater the practical investment one has in a belief, the stronger 
one’s evidence must be in order to know it.”152  In other words, for interest-relative 
invariantists, knowledge is fundamentally a practical concept.153 
Interest-relative invariantism thus provides a straightforward explanation for 
speakers’ reluctance to claim to “know” things in high-stakes situations, namely that it 
is more difficult to know something if the practical stakes are raised.  In LOW STAKES, 
for example, the speaker can claim to “know” that the bank is open because, given the 
conversational participants’ limited practical interest, knowledge requires only 
moderate epistemic justification.  In HIGH STAKES, by contrast, to know that the 
bank will be open would require very strong epistemic justification, a degree of 
justification the speaker apparently lacks.  Given the conversational participants’ 
heightened practical interest, merely moderate justification will not do.154 
A third, pragmatic explanation suggested by Jessica Brown and others is that 
what varies according to the practical stakes is not the proposition expressed by an 
attribution of “knowledge,” but rather whether that attribution is conversationally 
appropriate.155 
Here, a helpful analogy can be drawn to Paul Grice’s classic examples of 
conversational implicature.156  Suppose, for instance, that A is standing by an obviously 
immobilized car and is approached by B.  A says to B, “I am out of petrol.”  B 
                                                          
151 See generally STANLEY, supra note 28. 
152 Id. at 88. 
153 Interest-relative invariantism thus involves a rejection of what Stanley calls “intellectualism,” i.e. the 
thesis that the truth of a given “knowledge” attribution turns only on familiar, truth-conducive 
considerations.  Id. at 6-7. 
154 Put differently, to claim to “know” something is, for the interest-relative invariantist, to allege 
sufficient epistemic justification for practical purposes. 
155 See Brown, supra note 28; Patrick Rysiew, The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions, 35 NOÛS 477 
(2001). 
156 H.P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: SPEECH ACTS 41 (Peter Cole & Jerry 
L. Morgan eds. 1975). 
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responds, “There is a garage round the corner.”  As Grice observed, by uttering the 
sentence “There is a garage round the corner” in this context, B implies that the garage 
is (at least possibly) open and sells petrol.  The reason, Grice explains, is that otherwise 
B’s response to A would be conversationally irrelevant and so inappropriate.157  What 
matters to B (and hence to A), practically speaking, is that she is able to secure some 
petrol. 
With “know,” the suggestion by Brown and others is that the proposition 
expressed by uttering a sentence of the form “X knows that p” is just that X stands in 
a specific epistemic relation—namely, knowing—with p.   At the same time, what a 
speaker communicates indirectly by uttering such a sentence can vary with the practical 
stakes.  Thus, in the Bank Cases, the suggestion is that the proposition the speaker 
expresses is the same in each case: that he knows that the bank will be open on 
Saturday.  At the same time, what the speaker communicates indirectly in each case is 
different.  In LOW STAKES, what matters to the conversational participants, 
practically speaking, is whether the speaker satisfies a moderately demanding epistemic 
standard as to the bank’s being open.  As such, it is conversationally appropriate for 
him to say that he “knows” that the bank will be open so long as he satisfies that 
moderately demanding standard.  By contrast, in HIGH STAKES, what matters to the 
conversational participants is whether the speaker satisfies a very demanding epistemic 
standard with respect to the bank being open.  Hence, in that case, it is inappropriate 
for him to claim to “know” that the bank will be open if, as it seems, he fails to satisfy 
that more demanding standard. 
 Needless to say, adjudicating between these various technical explanations of 
how speakers use “know” goes beyond the scope of this Article.158  Worth mentioning, 
however, is that explaining how speakers use “clear” might be a bit more 
straightforward.  A central objection to contextualist explanations of “know” is that 
“know” does not appear to behave like other, uncontroversially context-sensitive 
terms.  Stanley, for example, observes that unlike “tall” or “flat,” “know” is not 
obviously gradable, i.e. whereas it makes sense to describe someone as “very tall” or 
“taller” than someone else, “know” has no obvious analogues.159  “Clear,” by contrast, 
is plainly gradable—one can say, for example, that it is “very clear” that one’s preferred 
candidate will win, or that the outcome of the gubernatorial election is “clearer” than 
the outcome of the Senate race.  What this suggests is that, however one makes sense 
of “know,” “clear” probably admits of a contextualist explanation.  Indeed, such an 
explanation seems largely unavoidable: insofar as something can be more or less clear, 
                                                          
157 Id. at 51.  Compare this with a situation in which A’s car is plainly in working order, and A says to 
B, “I am supposed to pick up a friend at a nearby garage.”  In that case, if B were to respond, “There is 
a garage round the corner,” B’s utterance would have no such implication. 
158 Nor is this list of candidate explanations exhaustive.  See, e.g., John MacFarlane, The Assessment 
Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY 197 (Tamar S. Gendler & 
John Hawthorne eds., 2005) (defending an assessment-relativist account of “knowledge” attributions); 
Jonathan Schaffer, From Contextualism to Contrastivism, 119 PHIL. STUD. 73 (2004) (defending a 
contrastivist account of “knowledge” attributions). 
159 STANLEY, supra note 28, at 37-46. 
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context must determine how clear something must be to count as “clear” for purposes 
of a given conversation.160  So construed, to claim that something is “clear” in a low-
stakes situation is to say that one satisfies a moderately demanding epistemic standard 
in relation to the thing at issue.  By contrast, to say that something is “clear” in a high-
stakes situation is to claim that one satisfies a very demanding epistemic standard with 
respect to that thing. 
 
C. Basic Insight 
 
 Whichever technical explanation one prefers, a straightforward connection 
between epistemic justification and practical interest comes through.  On any of the 
above explanations, it is appropriate to claim to “know” something only if one has 
adequate epistemic justification as to that thing.  And, on any of those explanations, 
what counts as adequate justification depends upon the practical interests of those 
involved.  In a low-stakes situation, the truth of the thing at issue (e.g., that the bank 
will be open on Saturday, that the preferred candidate will win the election) matters 
not very much to the participants in the conversation.  As such, what matters to those 
participants, practically speaking, is just that someone claiming to “know” that thing 
has moderate epistemic justification as to it.  In a high-stakes situation, by contrast, 
the truth of thing at issue matters a great deal to the conversational participants.  In 
those situations, then, what matters, practically speaking, is that claims to “know” that 
thing be supported by very strong epistemic justification.161 
                                                          
160 The reasoning here is similar to Chief Justice Marshall’s analysis of “necessary” in M‘Culloch  v. 
Maryland.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-15 (1819).  There, Marshall observed that “[a] thing may be 
necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably necessary.”  Id. at 414.  Because the term “admits 
of all degrees of comparison,” Marshall continued, attention to “context” is necessary to determine 
whether the term is best read in a “rigorous” or “more mitigated sense.”  Id. at 414-15.  A difference 
worth mentioning, however, is that Marshall’s reasoning probably supports the more modest thesis that 
appeal to context is necessary to determine whether “necessary” is used literally or, as he put it, 
“figurative[ly],” id. at 414—insofar it is not obviously felicitous to say that something is “more necessary” 
than something else, that “necessary” is a gradable adjective is at least controversial.  By contrast, insofar 
as it is plainly felicitous to say that something “clearer” than something else,” it seems comparably plain 
that “clear” is a gradable adjective and, in turn, that appeal to context is necessary to determine the 
threshold for “clarity” even if that term is used literally. 
161 A premise of the examples considered above is that the parties involved have considered all available 
evidence pertaining to their decision.  A further way in which raising the practical stakes can affect our 
epistemic burdens is by increasing the amount of evidence it is reasonable to consider.  This is just a 
corollary of the basic insight discussed above.  In a low-stakes situation, it will often be reasonable to 
act after considering only limited evidence, the reason being that the epistemic justification required to 
act on some premise is relatively low.  By contrast, in a high-stakes situation, reason will often require 
that one seek out additional evidence, assuming that time permits. 
 Because this Article focuses on Supreme Court cases, it seems reasonable to assume that, as 
in the above examples, the Court has considered all available evidence concerning statutory meaning in 
both high- and low-stakes statutory cases—as a rule, the quality of advocacy before the Supreme Court 
is excellent, such that even in low-stakes cases, the Court has all of the arguments in front of it.  That 
said, one might argue that, reasonably, the Court considers arguments more or less carefully depending 
on the practical stakes of the case.  If that’s right, a further albeit related reason why the Court might 
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 The coupling of epistemic justification and practical interest in our linguistic 
practice lends support to an already intuitive connection between epistemic and 
practical rationality.  Specifically, it bolsters the principle that the epistemological 
justification required to act on some premise increases as do the practical stakes.  This 
principle of rationality is seemingly reflected in all sorts of everyday conduct.  In the 
Bank Cases, for example, it is not just that it is reasonable for the speaker in LOW 
STAKES to say that he “knows” that the bank will be open on Saturday; it is also 
reasonable for him to act on that premise, i.e. it is okay for him to drive past the bank.  
By contrast, in HIGH STAKES, it seems reasonable, even mandatory, for the speaker 
to refrain from acting on that premise.  Similar cases abound.  The epistemic burden 
for acting on the premise that one turned off the stove plausibly varies according to 
whether one is leaving for the store or a week-long vacation.  So too the burden for 
acting on the premise that the holding of a particular Supreme Court decision was such 
and such, depending on whether one is at trivia night or arguing before the Supreme 
Court. 
 As the Bank Cases show, how to act in the absence of “knowledge” depends 
upon whether one course of action constitutes “playing it safe.”  In HIGH STAKES, 
for example, it would be equally unreasonable for the speaker to claim to “know” that 
the bank will be closed on Saturday.  Be that as it may, the speaker stops and waits in 
the line.  In stopping, however, he acts not act on the premise that the bank will be 
closed on Saturday.  Rather, he acts on the premise that whether the bank will be 
closed is uncertain.  And under conditions of uncertainty, stopping is the safe thing to 
do for the reason that the cost of stopping if the bank turns out to be open on Saturday 
is much lower than the cost of driving by if it turns out to be closed.162 
 In addition to everyday life, the identified connection between epistemic 
justification and practical interest seems manifest in our law, in particular our criminal 
law.163  The increased burden of proof for criminal conviction, for example, suggests 
that acting on the premise that a defendant is guilty of a criminal offense is higher 
stakes than acting on the premise that she committed a civil violation.  Less formally, 
                                                          
find “plain” meaning less often in high-stakes cases is that, upon considering the arguments more 
carefully, the Court realizes that the issue is more complicated than it might have seemed given just a 
cursory glance.  Again, because the connection between practical stakes and duty of inquiry is just a 
corollary of the basic insight discussed above, this variation of the story about why the Court behaves 
as it does is not really a competing explanation.  Still, it is a variation worth noting. 
162 Contrast this with a situation in which neither course of action constitutes playing it safe.  Suppose, 
for example, that a bomb is located in one of two buildings and is set to go off in a short period of time.  
Suppose further that the available evidence, although far from uniform, suggests on the whole that the 
bomb is in Building A rather than Building B.  Finally, suppose that, because of the time constraint, the 
bomb squad can only secure one building or the other.  In that paradigmatically high-stakes situation, 
it would be implausible for a member of the bomb squad to claim to “know” that the bomb is in 
Building A and not Building B.  Be that as it may, the thing to do is for the bomb squad to rush to 
Building A, acting on its “best guess” as to where the bomb is hidden.  The reason is that the cost 
associated with rushing erroneously to Building A or Building B is symmetrical.  As such, the thing to 
do under conditions of uncertainty is to act on one’s probabilistic assessment, however weak.  Thanks 
to Mitch Berman for suggesting this type of example. 
163 But see infra Part III.C. 
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the common sentiment that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is or should be 
more demanding in capital cases appears to reflect a practical understanding of 
“reasonable doubt.”164 
 This intuitive principle of rationality—again, that the epistemological 
justification required to act on some premise increases as do the practical stakes—has 
ready application in the area of statutory interpretation.  Again, the contemporary 
consensus is that courts must adhere to statutory meaning when “clear” (or “plain” or 
“unambiguous”).  Per this Article’s working hypothesis, for a court to say that statutory 
meaning is “clear” is for it to claim to have epistemic justification to say that it “knows” 
what that statute means.  As such, for a court to declare statutory meaning “clear” is 
for it to claim to have epistemic justification to act on the premise that the statute 
means what the court takes it to mean.  As the discussion above suggests, however, 
what counts as epistemic justification to act on the premise that a statute has a certain 
meaning depends on the practical stakes of the case.  If reading a statute in a particular 
way would raise no significant concerns, then moderate epistemic justification would 
seem to suffice for a court to declare that meaning “clear.”  If, by contrast, reading a 
statute that way would have “grave consequences,”165 then rationality would seem to 
require that a court have very strong epistemic justification before acting on the premise 
that it should be so read. 
 As in the everyday life, what to do in the absence of “knowledge” of statutory 
meaning depends upon whether there is a course of action that constitutes playing it 
safe.  By instructing courts to resolve cases on non-linguistic grounds if statutory 
meaning is not “clear,” the various doctrines discussed in Part III seem to reflect the 
judgment that, in the relevant cases, non-linguistic resolution is the safe course of 
action under conditions of uncertainty about meaning.166  In other words, what the 
various doctrines instruct is that, under conditions of uncertainty, courts should 
resolve statutory cases on the basis of some value other than interpretive accuracy.167  
And while the relative cost assessments contained in those doctrines are open to 
question (e.g., “Is erroneous invalidation really that bad?”168), those doctrines do at 
                                                          
164 See Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reasonable Doubt”, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 999-1000 (1993) (“Should 
not ‘reasonable doubt’ be taken more seriously when a defendant’s life is at stake?” (citing state court 
cases formally imposing a heightened standard for sufficiency of evidence in capital cases)). 
165 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 165 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (noting the “grave consequences” 
of deportation). 
166 For cases not governed by some such doctrine, courts are probably obliged to act on their best guess 
as to what the statute at issue means.  See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 984 (2005) (contrasting cases in which courts hold that a statute’s “best 
reading” is X with those in which they hold that a statute’s “only permissible reading” is X). 
167 Otherwise the thing to do under conditions of uncertainty would be for a court to act on its “best 
guess” as to what the statute means, i.e. to decide the case in accordance with the statute’s most natural 
reading.  See supra note 162.  Presumably, this is what courts must do under conditions of uncertainty 
absent some doctrine that authorizes case resolution on some non-linguistic basis. 
168 See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 8, at 2121-22 (questioning the assumption that erroneous 
invalidation is always more costly than erroneous interpretation). 
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least provide a positive law justification for courts resolving cases on non-linguistic 
grounds when statutory meaning is uncertain. 
 
III. APPLICATIONS 
 
 This Part applies the epistemological insight identified in Part III to different 
statutory interpretive settings.  Part III.A considers statutory cases involving 
constitutional challenges—cases the Court expressly regards as high-stakes.  Part III.B 
looks at cases involving non-constitutional challenges to major statutes, paradigmatic 
high-takes cases from the perspective of citizens.  As Parts III.A and III.B argue, the 
connection between practical stakes and epistemic justification analyzed in Part II 
helps to explain (or at least justify) courts seemingly loose treatment of text in these 
two areas. 
 Part III.C discusses the potential application of the above insight to criminal 
cases.  As this Part observes, current treatment of text in criminal cases suggests that 
courts regard such cases as relatively low-stakes.  To the extent this attitude is 
normatively unjustifiable, however, this Part contends that, as a purely epistemic 
matter, much more aggressive application of the rule of lenity is called for. 
 Part III.D looks at implications for judicial deference to agency interpretations 
of agency-administered statutes.  As this Part explains, whether the epistemological 
insight identified above recommends more or less deference depends upon which 
aspect of deferring to agencies one thinks more practically or constitutionally 
significant: 1) courts deferring to agencies concerning ‘what the law is,’ or 2) courts 
substituting their judgment for that of agencies on questions of policy. 
 
A. Constitutional Avoidance 
 
 According to Justice Holmes, “to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional” 
is “the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform.”169  The 
reasons courts articulate in support of this claim vary.  Sometimes they cite “respect 
for Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of constitutional limitations.”170  
Other times courts cite the “prudential concern that constitutional issues not be 
                                                          
169 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147–48 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring). 
170 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991); see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (“The 
Congress is a coequal branch of government whose Members take the same oath we do to uphold the 
Constitution of the United States.  … [W]e must have ‘due regard to the fact that this Court is not 
exercising a primary judgment but is sitting in judgment upon those who also have taken the oath to 
observe the Constitution and who have the responsibility for carrying on government.’” (quoting Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951))). 
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needlessly confronted.”171  Whatever their reasons, however, courts agree that cases 
involving constitutional challenges are unambiguously high-stakes.172 
 Starting from that premise, this Part suggests that courts’ nonstandard 
treatment of statutory text in constitutional cases is partially attributable to (or at least 
justified by) the raised stakes of those cases.  Again, pursuant to the canon of 
constitutional avoidance, a court will not read a statute in a way that raises serious 
constitutional doubts if an alternate reading is “fairly possible.”173  What this Part tries 
to show is that courts’ assessment of what is “fairly possible” in such cases is rightly 
affected by the perceived practical stakes. 
 
1. Bond v. United States 
 
 The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998174—which 
implements the near-identically worded international Convention on Chemical 
Weapons, ratified by the Senate in 1997175—prohibits the knowing “possess[ion]” or 
“use” of any “chemical weapon.”176  “Chemical weapon” is defined to include any 
“toxic chemical” not used for a “peaceful purpose.”177  “Toxic chemical,” in turn, is 
defined as “any chemical” that can “cause death, temporary incapacitation or 
permanent harm to humans or animals.”178   
 In Bond, federal prosecutors charged a Pennsylvania woman with two counts 
of possessing and using chemical weapons in violation of the Act.179  Upon discovering 
that her “closest friend” had engaged in an extramarital affair with her husband, the 
defendant acquired two chemicals conceded to be “toxic to humans and, in high 
enough doses, potentially lethal.”180  She proceeded to spread those chemicals on the 
friend’s “car door, mailbox, and door knob,” hoping that the friend would “develop 
an uncomfortable rash.”181  Though mostly unsuccessful, the defendant did cause the 
                                                          
171 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 
(1988); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962) (discussing the “countermajoritarian difficulty” involved in judicial 
review). 
172 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
173 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
174 112 Stat. 2681–856. 
175 1974 U.N.T.S. 317. 
176 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1). 
177 Id.  §§ 229F(1)(A); 229F(7)(A) (exempting the use of chemicals for “[a]ny peaceful purpose related 
to an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity”).  The Act 
contains other exemptions not relevant here.  See, e.g., id. §§ 229F(7)(B)-(D). 
178 Id. § 229F(8)(A). 
179 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2085-86 (2014). 
180 Id. at 2085. 
181  Id. (noting that it was “undisputed” that the defendant “did not intend to kill” her friend). 
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friend to suffer a “minor chemical burn on her thumb, which [the friend] treated by 
rinsing with water.”182 
 At first blush, application of the statute in Bond is straightforward.  The 
defendant’s “purpose,” after all, was evidently not “peaceful.”  And the chemicals she 
possessed and used were, again, “potentially lethal” and so seemingly “toxic.”  Under 
the “plain” meaning of the statute, the defendant thus acted in violation.183  Or so it 
would seem. 
 On appeal, the defendant argued that her conviction should be set aside on 
the ground that the Act as applied to her conduct exceeded Congress’s enumerated 
powers and invaded powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.184  The 
Constitution, the defendant maintained, does not permit Congress to police “local 
crime,” a “bedrock principle” unaffected by the implementation of a valid, non-self-
executing treaty.185  In so arguing, the defendant appeared to call into question the 
Court’s century-old precedent Missouri v. Holland,186 which stated that “[i]f the treaty 
is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute” that implements it “as 
a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.”187 
Rather than address that constitutional question, the Court sided with the 
defendant on statutory grounds, holding that the Act, interpreted correctly, did not 
cover her conduct.  Anticipating skepticism, the Court gestured at the epistemological 
insight discussed in Part II, remarking that otherwise “clear” text can be made 
“ambigu[ous]” by the “deeply serious consequences of adopting” its otherwise most 
natural reading.188  As the Court observed, our “constitutional structure” leaves the 
prosecution of “purely local crimes” to the States.189  As such, it continued, one should 
hesitate to infer that Congress intended to “upset the Constitution’s balance between 
national and local power” by “defin[ing] as a federal crime conduct readily denounced 
as criminal by the States.”190  The Court emphasized further the “ordinary meaning” 
of the phrase “chemical weapon” calls to mind “chemical warfare,” not “spreading 
irritating chemicals on [a] doorknob.”191  For all of these reasons, the Court concluded 
                                                          
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 2094 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
184 Id. at 2087. 
185 Brief for Petitioner at 2, 16-19, Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (No. 12-158), 2013 WL 
1963862, at *2, *16-19. 
186 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
187 Id. at 432. 
188 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2090. 
189 Id. at 2083, 2087. 
190 Id. at 2093. 
191 Id. at 2090-91. 
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that, to whatever conduct the statute extends,192 it did not extend to this “unremarkable 
local offense.”193 
In dissent, Justice Scalia ridiculed the majority for its reliance upon, in his view, 
a laughable if also dangerous epistemological principle.194  He likewise dismissed the 
majority’s specific reasoning, insisting that, for example, the “ordinary meaning” of a 
phrase is “irrelevant” when that phrase is specifically and clearly defined.195 
For the reasons articulated in Part II, Justice Scalia was wrong to mock the 
majority’s epistemological principle.  He was right, nonetheless, to criticize the 
majority’s application thereof.  As Part II argues, raising the practical stakes makes it 
more difficult to “know” what a statute means.  It does not, however, make it 
impossible to do so.  Nor does it make all readings equally or even minimally plausible.  
In Bond, the majority observed rightly that, given the constitutional stakes, it was more 
difficult to “know” what Congress meant by “chemical weapon” than in the ordinary 
case.  Be that as it may, the majority put forth only minimal effort to explain why, 
constitutional stakes notwithstanding, the series of seemingly precise and applicable 
statutory definitions did not control the case.  In terms of linguistic analysis, really all 
the Court had to offer was that sometimes it “go[es] without saying” that a class of 
cases is implicitly excluded from a superficially general prescription.  That’s true: 
sometimes, for example, “person” refers just to natural persons;196 other times 
“conviction” means domestic conviction. 197  Be that as it may, the majority in Bond gave 
no indication which class of cases the statute excluded implicitly (cf. corporate persons, 
foreign convictions).  Nor did it explain to which specific class of cases the Act was 
implicitly limited.198  Such specification of Congress’s meaning is part and parcel of a 
plausible linguistic story of implicit exclusion.199  Here instead the majority reasoned, in 
                                                          
192 See id. at 2097 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Thanks to the Court’s revisions, the Act, which before was 
merely broad, is now broad and unintelligible.  ‘[N]o standard of conduct is specified at all.’” (quoting 
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)).  See also infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text. 
193 Id. at 2083. 
194 Id. at 2096 (“Imagine what future courts can do with that judge-empowering principle: Whatever has 
improbably broad, deeply serious, and apparently unnecessary consequences ... is ambiguous!”). 
195 Id. 
196 Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194 (1993) (holding 
that only natural “person[s]” may qualify for treatment in forma pauperis under the federal statute). 
197 Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005) (holding that a statute making it unlawful for a person 
“convicted in any court” of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to 
possess a firearm refers only to domestic convictions). 
198 Ironically, the defendant in Bond did suggest one such class when she argued that her conduct: fit 
within the Act’s “peaceful purpose” exemption.  According to the defendant, “peaceful” as used in the 
Act means something like not “warlike.”  See 134 S. Ct. at 2094 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Because her 
conduct was clearly not “warlike,” the defendant concluded, it thus fit within the “peaceful purpose” 
exception.  See id.  As Justice Scalia observed in dissent, that reading fails for the reason that it renders 
superfluous the Act’s specific exemption for the use of “self-defense devices” such as “pepper spray,” 
see 18 U.S.C. § 229C, “the prosaic uses of which are surely nonwarlike.”  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2094 n.2. 
199 A distinguishing feature of statutory interpretation in the textualist era is that a court is expected to 
supply a plausible linguistic story in support of any reading it adopts.  This contrasts with an earlier era 
in which providing a plausible policy story would suffice.  See Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, supra note 5, 
at 828-29.  In recent years, Abbe Gluck in particular has praised courts for their renewed commitment 
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effect, that this case was surely excluded,200 harkening back to the earlier era of ad hoc 
judicial carve-outs.201 
 
2. Northwest Austin 
 
 Bond is helpful in that it supplies a judicial gloss on the epistemological insight 
discussed in Part II.  Northwest Austin, by contrast, says nothing of interest.  It does, 
however, better show that insight in action. 
 Like Bond, Northwest Austin was conceived by commentators principally as a 
constitutional case.202  In Northwest Austin, the plaintiff was a small Texas utility district 
seeking relief from the “preclearance” requirements set forth by § 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965.203  Under § 5, covered “States” and “political subdivisions” are 
required to obtain federal approval before changing their election laws in any way.204  
Section 4(b), in turn, contains a “coverage formula” used to determine which “States” 
or “political subdivisions” are subject to preclearance requirements.205  Any covered 
“State” or “political subdivision” may seek relief from preclearance requirements 
pursuant to the “bailout” provision contained in § 4(a).206 
 In Northwest Austin, the plaintiff argued that it was a “political subdivision” 
within the meaning of § 4(a) and so entitled to seek bailout relief.207  As the Court 
observed, there is “no dispute that the district is a political subdivision” of a covered 
State “in the ordinary sense of the term.”208  It is, after all, a “division of a state that 
                                                          
to articulating policy stories in support of their readings.   Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect 
Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62 (2015) 
(praising the Court for its express attention to Congress’s “legislative plans”).  As I have argued 
elsewhere, any defensible version of statutory analysis is attendant to Congress’s apparent practical ends.  
See Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, supra note 91, at 995-98 .  Be that as it may, coming 
to accept readings of statutes on the basis of a plausible policy story alone, i.e. absent a plausible 
supporting linguistic story, would mark a dramatic, unfortunate shift in our interpretive practice.  See 
supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
200 Along with an improbable hypothetical.  See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2091 (“Any parent would be guilty 
of a serious federal offense—possession of a chemical weapon—when, exasperated by the children’s 
repeated failure to clean the goldfish tank, he considers poisoning the fish with a few drops of vinegar.”). 
201 See Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, supra note 5, at 831-32 (analogizing Bond to the old Holy Trinity). 
202 See Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. 
REV. 181, 201-02 (“[V]oting rights experts believed that the statutory … argument had no chance ….  
Instead, it seemed unavoidable that the Court would address the constitutionality of the [statute].”); see 
also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197 (2009) (“Th[e] constitutional 
question has attracted ardent briefs from dozens of interested parties, but the importance of the 
question does not justify our rushing to decide it.”). 
203 Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 200.   
204 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a). 
205 Id. § 10303(b), invalidated by Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
206 Id. § 10303(a). 
207 Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 200-01. 
208.Id. at 206. 
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exists primarily to discharge some function of local government.”209  The problem for 
the plaintiff, as the district court panel observed below,210 was that § 14(c)(2) of the 
Act specifically defines “political subdivision” as “any county or parish, except that 
where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or 
parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of a State which conducts 
registration for voting.”211  Because the plaintiff does not conduct voting registration, 
it plainly falls outside that definition.212  As such, it seems straightforwardly ineligible 
for bailout relief under § 4(a). 
 In addition to its statutory argument, the plaintiff in Northwest Austin argued in 
the alternative that the preclearance requirements imposed by § 5 exceeded Congress’ 
powers under Enforcement Clause of Fifteenth Amendment and so were 
unconstitutional.213  According to the plaintiff, the Act’s preclearance requirements 
“differentiate[] between the States, despite our historic tradition that all the States 
enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’”214  As such, deviation from equal sovereignty requires 
“showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the 
problem that it targets.”215  The concern raised by the plaintiff is that the problem § 5 
is intended to address “may no longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out.”  
As the Court observed, “[t]he statute’s coverage formula is based on data that is now 
more than 35 years old, and,” it opined, there is considerable evidence that it fails to 
account for current political conditions.”216 
 Again, rather than address that constitutional question, the Court sided with 
the plaintiff on statutory grounds, holding that the plaintiff is a “political subdivision” 
for purposes of § 4(a) even if not for purposes of § 14(c)(2).  According to the Court, 
the definition of “political subdivision” articulated in § 14(c)(2) applied to some but 
not all uses of that phrase within the Act.217  Specifically, the Court held that the 
definition applied to uses of the phrase in §  4(b), but not to uses in § 4(a) or, for that 
matter, § 5.218  To substantiate this claim, the Court referred to its earlier decision in  
United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama,219 in which it remarked that 
§ 14(c)(2)’s definition applied to uses of “political subdivision” in § 4(b), but not to 
those in § 5.220  Reasoning that it had established already that § 14(c)(2)’s definition 
                                                          
209 Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1197 (8th ed. 2004)). 
210 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 230-35 (D.D.C. 2008), 
rev’d and remanded sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 129 S. Ct. 2504 
(2009). 
211 52 U.S.C. § 10310(c)(2). 
212 See Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 200, 206. 
213 Id. at 197. 
214 Id. at 203 (quoting United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960)). 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 208. 
218 Id.  See also Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (invalidating § 4(b)’s coverage formula 
on equal sovereignty grounds). 
219 435 U.S. 110 (1978). 
220 Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 207 (citing Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 128-29, 130 n.18). 
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was of limited application within the Act, the Court concluded that it was at least 
plausible that that definition did not apply to § 4(a), and, in turn, that “political 
subdivision” as used in § 4(a) retained its ordinary, more expansive meaning. 
 As the district court panel observed, the Court’s reading of § 4(a) is not without 
textual difficulty.221  Specifically, § 4(a)’s bailout provision applies not to “political 
subdivisions” in general, but rather to: 
any political subdivision of such State (as such subdivision existed on 
the date such determinations were made with respect to such State), 
though such determinations were not made with respect to such subdivision as a 
separate unit, or in any political subdivision with respect to which such 
determinations have been made as a separate unit.222 
The function of the italicized language is to make clear that a “political subdivision” 
of a covered State is permitted to seek bailout relief even if that subdivision has not 
been deemed subject to preclearance requirements specifically.223  In other words, even 
if a subdivision is “covered” only because the State in which it exists was determined 
to be “covered” pursuant to an application of the coverage formula articulated in 
§ 4(b), that subdivision can request relief apart from the State as a whole.224  The 
problem the italicized language creates for the Court’s analysis is that it suggests 
strongly that the “political subdivisions” referred to in § 4(a) were at least eligible for 
coverage determination pursuant to an application of the coverage formula in § 4(b).225  
But, of course, the only “political subdivisions” eligible for a § 4(b) determination are 
those that fall within § 14(c)(2)’s definition. 
 Under normal circumstances, the textual difficulty just identified would 
seemingly be enough to render the Court’s reading of § 4(a) unavailable.  What this 
Part suggests, however, is that given the heightened practical stakes of the case, it is at 
least plausible that the Court’s preferred reading is “fairly possible.”  To see why, 
consider first that the Court’s reading is not, strictly speaking, foreclosed by the 
structure of the sentence in § 4(a).  So long as some subset of the “political subdivisions” 
referenced in § 4(a) are eligible for coverage determination pursuant to § 4(b), one can 
read “political subdivision” in § 4(a) broadly without violating what Grice called the 
                                                          
221 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 230-35 (D.D.C. 2008), 
rev’d and remanded sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 129 S. Ct. 2504 
(2009). 
222 52 U.S.C. § 10310(c)(2). 
223 See Nw. Austin, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 231. 
224 Prior to amendment in 1982, only “subdivisions” specifically determined to be “covered” were 
eligible to request bailout relief.  Id.; see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 167 (1980) 
(holding that a city within a covered state was ineligible for bailout relief because § 4(b) had never been 
applied to it). 
225 See Nw. Austin, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (“Had Congress stopped at the comma, there might be some 
question as to whether it intended to use the term “political subdivision” in its broadest sense.  But 
Congress did not stop at the comma.”). 
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“maxim of quantity.”226  By analogy, suppose that Congress were to enact a public-
financing system for congressional races, providing matching funds for: 
any candidate who has raised in excess of $10,000 in her congressional 
district, though she has not been approved for presidential-primary 
matching funds, or any candidate who has been approved for 
presidential-primary matching funds. 227 
The eligibility criteria for President are more restrictive than those for Congress.228  As 
such, not all candidates for Congress are eligible to run for President simultaneously, 
or, in turn, to be considered for presidential-primary matching funds.  Be that as it 
may, it would be bizarre to suggest that “candidate,” as used above, referred only to 
candidates eligible to run for President simultaneously. 
A related but distinct worry is that the Court’s reading of § 4(a) renders the 
italicized language superfluous.229  If, after all, in-State “political subdivisions” ineligible 
for a § 4(b) determination are eligible for bailout relief, what is the purpose of 
specifying that a subdivision need not have received such a determination?  Again, under 
normal conditions, this argument would have real force.  Consider, though, that there 
is a conceivable response.  Just prior to the addition of the italicized language, the 
Court had held in City of Rome v. United States230 that only “political subdivisions” 
specifically designated for coverage under § 4(b) were eligible for bailout relief under 
§ 4(a).231  The effect of the subsequent amendment was thus to eliminate specific 
designation as a prerequisite for bailout relief.  As such, even if the italicized language 
is, in terms of content, redundant on the Court’s reading of § 4(b), that language could 
conceivably serve to emphasize the change in the law brought about by that 
amendment.232 
                                                          
226 Grice, supra note 156, at 45 (observing that “overinformativeness may be confusing in that it is liable 
to raise side issues; and there may also be an indirect effect, in that the hearers may be misled as a result 
of thinking that there is some particular POINT in the provision of the excess of information”). 
227 To receive presidential-primary matching funds, a “candidate” must, among other things, raise in 
excess of “$5,000 in contributions from residents of each of at least 20 States.”  26 U.S.C. § 9033(b)(3). 
228 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United 
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; 
neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five 
Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.”). 
229 See Nw. Austin, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (reasoning that “[u]nder the District’s interpretation, this 
language would be surplusage”). 
230 446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
231 Id. at 167. 
232 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 209 (2009) (“In 1982, however, 
Congress expressly repudiated City of Rome and instead embraced ‘piecemeal’ bailout.”).  Rick Hasen 
argues forcefully that the legislative history surrounding the 1982 amendment cuts against this reading.  
See Hasen, supra note 202, at 205-06 (“There was no ‘express repudiation’ of City of Rome in the text of 
the 1982 renewal.  Indeed, City of Rome is not mentioned in the Senate Report as being repudiated.”).  
Because the relevance of legislative history to statutory meaning is sharply contested, however, it seems 
dubious to suggest that appeal to legislative history can render a reading not “fairly available.”  See, e.g., 
John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 124 (2001) (observing 
that “textualists tend to be stricter in their application of clear statement rules, because they require the 
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More generally, note that, in contrast to Bond, the Court in Northwest Austin is 
able to articulate a distinctly linguistic story in support of its seemingly unusual 
reading.233  As in Bond, the Court’s reading appears to be undermined by a clear, 
applicable statutory definition.  Unlike in Bond, however, the Court offers a specific 
explanation as to why that definition is inapposite, namely that the definition applies 
to certain subsections but not to others.  Schematically, that explanation is familiar to 
ordinary language and, for that matter, the law.234 
 In sum, although the Court’s reading of the statute in Northwest Austin is not 
without difficulty, it is, upon closer inspection, at least not ridiculous.  And, given the 
high-stakes of the case, perhaps that is enough to render its reading “fairly possible.” 
 
B. Non-Constitutional Challenges 
 
 Following the Court’s textualist turn, litigants have taken to ‘challenging’ 
statutes on non-constitutional grounds.  Such challenges consist of a litigant advancing 
an interpretation that, if accepted, would radically curtail the implementation regime 
of the statute at issue.  In recent years, litigants have mounted non-constitutional 
challenges to a number of major statutes.  These cases are, from the public’s 
perspective, the very definition of ‘high-stakes.’  Up to now, such challenges have been 
mostly unsuccessful.  The reason, according to critics, is that courts have been willing 
to stretch or even disregard statutory text to preserve the status quo. 
 This Part argues instead that courts’ repeated rejection of non-constitutional 
challenges to major statutes is at least partially attributable to (or justified by) the 
epistemic insight identified in Part II.  In such cases, courts have indeed rejected 
readings of statutes that would have been “clear” under ordinary circumstances.  
Because of the incredibly high stakes of these cases, however, this Part suggests that 
courts are epistemically rational in exhibiting extraordinary caution before accepting 
readings that would have such unsettling effects. 
 
 
 
                                                          
expression of clear intent to be derived from the text of the statute, rather than in the legislative 
history”). 
233 See supra notes 217 -232 and accompanying text. 
234 See Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) (“It is not unusual for the same 
word to be used with different meanings in the same act, and there is no rule of statutory construction 
which precludes the courts from giving to the word the meaning which the Legislature intended it 
should have in each instance.”). 
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1. King v. Burwell 
 
 In King v. Burwell,235 the plaintiffs challenged the implementation regime of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), the most significant health 
reform legislation since the passage of Medicare and Medicaid.236  As widely discussed, 
the PPACA consists primarily of three interdependent reforms.237  First, the Act 
prohibits insurers from denying coverage or increasing premiums on the basis of 
preexisting conditions (community rating).238  Second, it imposes a tax penalty on 
nonexempt individuals who fail to maintain coverage (individual mandate).239  Third, 
it provides subsidies in the form of tax credits for the purchase of insurance by low-
income persons (subsidies).240  Together, community rating and subsidies help make 
insurance affordable for customers by ensuring a price not in excess of a reasonable 
percentage of income.  At the same time, the individual mandate helps make the 
provision of affordable insurance financially feasible for insurers by ensuring a broad 
risk pool. 
 As King brought out, a concern with the above characterization is that the 
specific language of the PPACA’s subsidies provision appears to limit the availability 
of tax credits in a way that is largely incompatible with the Act functioning as a “three-
legged stool.”241  The worry results from the Act’s permitting different types of health 
insurance “Exchanges,” i.e. state-specific marketplaces on which customers can 
compare and purchase insurance policies.242  Under § 1311 of the Act, “[e]ach State 
shall . . . establish an [Exchange] for the State.”243  In turn, § 36B of the Internal 
Revenue Code, enacted as part of the PPACA, instructs that tax credits shall be 
available for persons who purchase health insurance “through an Exchange 
established by the State under [§] 1311 of the [Act].”244  Because, however, Congress 
cannot require states to implement federal laws,245 if a state refuses or is unable to set 
up an Exchange, § 1321 of the Act provides that the federal government, through the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, “shall . . . establish and operate such 
Exchange within the State.”246  As Jonathan Adler and others observed, these 
provisions read together seem to suggest that the PPACA authorizes tax credits only 
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for insurance purchased on a state-run Exchange, i.e. an Exchange “established” by a 
state “under [§] 1311.”247 
In King, the plaintiffs challenged an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rule 
interpreting the PPACA’s subsidy provision as authorizing the agency to grant tax 
credits to persons who purchased insurance through either a state-run or a federally 
facilitated Exchange.248  The challengers argued that the IRS rule was inconsistent with 
the plain language of § 36B, which, according to them, authorizes subsidies for 
insurance purchased through state-run Exchanges alone.249  At the time of the 
challenge, more than half of states utilized federally facilitated Exchanges.250  Within 
two years of the rule’s adoption, millions of individuals had purchased insurance 
through such an Exchange, with the vast majority relying upon subsidies.251  If the 
challenge were to have succeeded, health insurance would thus have been rendered 
unaffordable for a huge number of would-be customers absent state or congressional 
action.  In turn, most of those individuals would have become exempt from the 
individual mandate on grounds of financial hardship.  Under these conditions, the 
individual mandate would plausibly have failed to produce a broad enough risk pool 
to avoid adverse selection, causing premiums to increase precipitously.252 
 For doctrinal reasons, the Government conceded in King that § 36B was 
precisely worded, i.e. that the language at issue was not attributable to a drafting 
mistake.253  Given that concession, the Government was left to argue that § 36B’s 
reference to Exchanges “established by the State under [§] 1311” is a “term of art,” 
encompassing state-run and federally facilitated Exchanges alike.254  Famously, the 
Supreme Court agreed, reasoning that, “when read in context,” the language of § 36B 
was “ambiguous,” and that although the “most natural reading” of the pertinent phrase 
was as limited to state-run Exchanges, it was “also possible” that the phrase referred 
to federally facilitated Exchanges as well.255  As evidence, the Court cited various 
anomalies the plaintiff’s reading would produce elsewhere in the statute, requiring, for 
example, the creation of federally facilitated Exchanges on which there would be no 
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“qualified individuals” eligible to shop,256 as well as the reporting of information for a 
“[r]econciliation” of tax credits that could never occur.257  As to the apparent contrast 
between Exchanges “established “under [§] 1311” and § 1321, respectively, the Court 
observed that § 1321 instructs the Secretary to “establish and operate such Exchange 
within the State.”258  “By using the phrase ‘such Exchange,’” the Court explained, 
§ 1321 “instructs the Secretary to establish and operate the same Exchange that the 
State was directed to establish” under § 1311.259 
 So was a broad reading of § 36B at least “possible”?  Under normal 
circumstances, the answer would seem to be no.  Again, given the plain contrast 
between § 1311 and § 1321 together with § 36B’s reference to Exchanges “established 
under [§] 1311,” it would be “natural” infer that § 36B excludes Exchanges established 
under § 1321.  More still, that § 1321 instructs the Secretary to establish “such Exchange 
within the State,” would suggest ordinarily that an Exchange established under § 1321 
is qualitatively similar to but numerically distinct from an Exchange “established by the State 
under [§] 1311.”260  And while the various anomalies to which the Court pointed are 
real—and indicative of a drafting mistake261—those anomalies do not cause § 36B’s 
specific language to vanish.262 
 As the Court noted, however, these were not normal circumstances.  To accept 
the plaintiffs’ reading of § 36B would have been to undermine substantially the 
PPACA’s implementation regime, potentially “destabiliz[ing] the individual insurance 
market in any State” with a federally facilitated Exchange.263  Under such 
circumstances, it would make sense for a court to require increased epistemic 
justification before regarding the “destabiliz[ing]” reading as “clear.”  Whether King is 
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best understood as a display of reasonable epistemic caution is, of course, open to 
question.264  Also unclear is whether the Court’s preferred reading was “fairly 
available,” even considering the heightened practical stakes.265  Regardless, what King 
represents is a type of case in which it would be entirely reasonable, as an epistemic 
matter, for a court to look at a text with more hesitation than it would in a run-of-the-
mill case.  And, if nothing else, the Court in King did look at § 36B with greater-than-
usual skepticism—and it did so with an eye to the practical stakes of the case.266 
 
2. Inclusive Communities 
 
 Whereas King was about preempting the implementation of a new statute, the 
challenge in Inclusive Communities was about curtailing the implementation of an old 
one. 
In Inclusive Communities, the defendant was a state agency responsible for the 
distribution of federal low-income housing tax credits.267  A local nonprofit sued the 
agency, alleging that its “disproportionate” allocation of those tax credits—skewed 
toward projects in “predominantly black inner-city areas” and away from those in 
“predominantly white suburban neighborhoods”—caused segregated housing 
patterns to persist in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA),268 a landmark 1968 civil 
rights law.269  Importantly, the nonprofit’s was a so-called disparate-impact claim, i.e. 
a claim predicated upon disproportionate adverse effects on minorities not justified by 
a legitimate rationale.270  A disparate-impact claim contrasts with a claim of intentional 
discrimination, i.e. a claim that a defendant acted with discriminatory intent or 
motive.271 
 The question presented in Inclusive Communities was whether disparate-impact 
claims are cognizable under the FHA.  Arguing no, the defendant relied significantly 
upon the “plain text” of the statute.272  In relevant part, the FHA makes it unlawful to: 
refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse 
to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or 
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deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, 
familial status, or national origin.273 
The Act similarly provides that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business 
includes engaging in real estate-related transactions to discriminate 
against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the 
terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, 
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.274 
According to the defendant, because it is limited to actions taken “because of” a 
protected trait, the FHA precludes disparate-impact liability.  In the words of Justice 
Alito, “A person acts ‘because of’ something else … if that something else ‘was the 
‘reason’ that the [person] decided to act.’”275  And a protected trait is only one’s 
“reason” for action if discriminatory treatment is intentional.  As Justice Alito went on 
to observe, “many other federal statutes use the phrase ‘because of’ to signify what 
that phrase means in ordinary speech,”276 including, for example, the federal hate crime 
statute, which authorizes enhanced sentences for certain crimes only if the defendant 
acted with discriminatory intent.277 
 As in King, the Court rejected the restrictive reading of the statute proposed, 
apparent textual strength notwithstanding.  Holding that disparate-impact claims are, 
indeed, cognizable under the FHA, the Court emphasized that the Act had long been 
so understood.  By 1988, the Court noted, all nine Courts of Appeals to have addressed 
the question had so held.278  More still, when Congress amended the FHA that year, it 
left unaltered the portions of the statute at issue—evidence, according to the Court, 
that Congress had “accepted and ratified” those “unanimous” holdings.279 
 The Court relied, in addition, on two prior decisions in which it held that 
similar “because of” language created disparate-impact liability in similar statutes.  
First, in 1971, the Court held in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.280 that provisions in Title VII 
making it unlawful for an employer to make an employment decision “because of” a 
protected trait of an employee or applicant encompassed disparate-impact claims.281  
In Griggs, the Court based its decision almost entirely upon Congress’s apparent 
purpose of “achiev[ing] equality of employment opportunities” and “remov[ing] 
barriers” that have operated to the advantage of white employees.282  In a sign of an 
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earlier methodological era, the Court made no effort to explain how its holding could 
be reconciled with the specific wording of the provisions at issue.283  More than thirty 
years later, in Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss.,284 a plurality held that sections of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) that render unlawful 
employment decisions made “because of” an employee’s or applicant’s age similarly 
create disparate-impact liability.285  Recognizing the parallel with Griggs, the plurality 
insisted that, despite its reliance on purpose, that decision also “represented the better 
reading of the statutory text.”286  According to the plurality, because Title VII makes 
unlawful actions that “deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of” a protected trait, the statute evinces 
a concern not just with employer motivation but with “the effects of the action on the 
employee.”287  So too, the plurality reasoned, with the ADEA, which prohibits action 
that “would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of” that individual’s age.288 
Returning to Inclusive Communities, the Court reasoned that, as with Title VII 
and the ADEA, the language of the FHA indicates a concern not just with motive but 
with consequence.  Specifically, the FHA makes it unlawful to “refuse to negotiate for 
the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person 
because of” a protected trait.289  This, according to the Court, is the same sort of 
“results-oriented language” that supported recognition of disparate-impact liability in 
both Griggs and Smith.290 
The Court’s reasoning on the above point is shaky.  Even if the FHA (and 
Title VII and the ADEA) make unlawful the bringing about of certain consequences, 
unlawfulness is nonetheless contingent upon bringing about those consequences 
“because of” a protected trait.  In other words, even if liability can result despite one’s 
having some non-discriminatory goal, it still seems that, to be liable, one’s motivation 
must be discriminatory.  To illustrate the contrast, suppose that a landlord were to tell 
racially stereotypical jokes to minority rental applicants, intending not to dissuade 
those applicants from renting, but rather to cause them to laugh.  In that case, the 
landlord might still be liable under the FHA for “mak[ing]” his rental property 
“unavailable” to minority applicants insofar as her jokes make minority applicants 
uncomfortable and so discourage them from renting.  Although the landlord’s goal in 
joking is innocent (e.g., to cause laughter), the consequence of her joking is not (e.g., 
to discourage minority applicants).  More still, the landlord’s motivation for joking is 
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partially discriminatory in that one of her reasons for joking with minority applicants is 
that those applicants are minorities. 
So, in an ordinary case, a court would probably read the “because of” language 
at issue to prohibit only intentional discrimination.  That seems to be the better reading 
of the statute.  Indeed, under typical circumstances, one could fairly characterize that 
language as “clear.”  Be that as it may, the circumstances surrounding Inclusive 
Communities were far from typical: to have adopted the “most natural” reading of the 
statute would have been to curtail dramatically the implementation of a major civil 
rights statute.291  Given those unusually high stakes, one can see how members of the 
Court might reasonably have become less than certain that the “most natural” reading 
was, in fact, correct.  Particularly so given the longstanding judicial practice of reading 
the FHA and similar statutes ‘unnaturally’—under the circumstances, considerations 
of epistemic humility alone might have been enough to shake a justice’s confidence in her 
own linguistic assessment.292  Thus, to the extent that courts should preserve existing 
implementation regimes absent a “clear” indication from Congress,293 one can see how 
the raised stakes of Inclusive Communities might make sense of (or at least vindicate) its 
otherwise (textually) surprising result. 
 
C. Rule of Lenity 
 
 The rule of lenity requires courts to resolve unclarity in criminal statutes in 
favor of defendants.294  The purpose of the rule is to “ensure that those subjected to 
criminal prosecution have adequate notice of the conduct that the law prohibits,”295 
and to prevent courts, rather than legislatures from “defin[ing] criminal activity.”296  
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Structurally, the rule of lenity is thus identical to the canon of constitutional avoidance: 
If statutory meaning is less than clear, courts must select among available readings on 
the basis of non-linguistic considerations. 
 Same as the avoidance canon in form, the rule of lenity could hardly be more 
different in operation.  As discussed in Part III.A, courts have a high threshold for 
what counts as “clear” text in the face of constitutional questions.  In criminal cases, 
by contrast, courts’ threshold for clarity is remarkably low.  Indeed, that threshold is 
so low as to approach its logical limit. 
In the abstract, the current approach to lenity is summarized neatly as follows: 
The simple existence of some statutory ambiguity … is not sufficient 
to warrant application of th[e] rule, for most statutes are ambiguous to 
some degree.  The rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing everything 
from which aid can be derived, we can make no more than a guess as to 
what Congress intended.  To invoke the rule, we must conclude that 
there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.297 
In other words, so long as courts have some inclination about statutory meaning, lenity 
has no role to play.  Functionally, then, statutory text counts as “clear” in criminal 
cases so long as courts have an “opinion as to the best reading.”298  Put differently, so 
long as some reading seems to courts more plausible than the others, operationally 
speaking, that reading is “plainly” correct. 
 In the concrete, courts’ handling of criminal statutes is exemplified by the 
Court’s recent decision in Lockhart v. United States.299  In that case, the question before 
the Court was whether an enhanced sentencing provision applicable to defendants 
with a “prior conviction ... under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual 
abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward”300 applies to a 
defendant whose only prior state-law conviction is for sexual abuse of an adult.301  
Arguing no, the defendant in Lockhart—previously convicted under New York state 
law for sexual abuse of his then-53-year-old girlfriend—contended that the participle 
phrase “involving a minor or ward” binds each item in the list of predicate crimes 
(“aggravated sexual abuse,” “sexual abuse,” and “abusive sexual conduct”).302  Because 
his prior conviction was not for “sexual abuse … of a minor or ward,” the defendant 
continued, the enhancement provision thus did not apply.  In response, the 
                                                          
should define criminal activity.”); accord Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great 
Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 704 n.18 (1995). 
297 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). 
298 Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983-84 (2005) 
(contrasting decisions that expresses a court’s “opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous statute” 
with those that identify a “statute’s clear meaning”). 
299 136 S.Ct. 958 (2016). 
300 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
301 Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at 961. 
302 Id. at 961-62. 
45 
 
Government argued that “involving a minor or ward” binds only the last item in the 
list of predicate offenses (“abusive sexual conduct”), and so that the defendant’s prior 
state-law conviction for “sexual abuse” of an adult was enough to trigger the 
enhancement provision.303 
 Siding with the Government, the Court assured that “the provision’s text and 
context together reveal a straightforward reading.”304  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Sotomayor invoked what it called the “rule of the last antecedent,” according to which 
a “limiting clause or phrase ... should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or 
phrase that it immediately follows.”305  Acknowledging that this “rule” reflected at best 
a presumption, Justice Sotomayor went on to note the seeming parallel between the 
language at issue and the chapter of the federal criminal code pertaining to “sexual 
abuse,” a “prior conviction” under which triggered the same enhancement 
provision.306  As Justice Sotomayor observed, the first three sections of that chapter 
are titled “Sexual Abuse,” “Aggravated Sexual Abuse,” and “Sexual Abuse of a Ward 
or Minor,” respectively.  According to Justice Sotomayor, that “[similarity appears to 
be more than a coincidence.”307  Swatting aside the defendant’s rule of lenity argument, 
Justice Sotomayor thus concluded that the “text and structure of [the provision] 
confirm[ed]” the Government’s reading.308 
 In dissent, Justice Kagan offered various ordinary conversation and legal 
examples in which, intuitively, the “modifying phrase … applies to each term in the 
preceding list, not just the last” (e.g., “the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the 
United States”).309  In an effort to match canon with canon, Justice Kagan also invoked 
what she called the “series-qualifier” canon,310 i.e. the principle that “‘[w]hen there is a 
straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series,’ a 
modifier at the end of the list ‘normally applies to the entire series.’”311  Despite its 
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“fancy name,” Justice Kagan insisted, that principle “reflects the completely ordinary 
way that people speak and listen, write and read.”312 
 Whether Justice Sotomayor or Justice Kagan has the better reading in Lockhart 
is hard to say.  Commenting on the exchange, Judge Frank Easterbrook remarked that 
he has no idea who is right.313  But if even arch-textualist Judge Easterbrook can’t make 
heads or tails of a text, how can the rule of lenity fail to apply?  The only explanation, 
it seems, is that, in criminal cases, whatever reading a court deems “best” is, almost by 
definition, “clear” enough to render that rule inapplicable.  What this suggests is that 
courts regard criminal cases as having remarkably low stakes.  Indeed, if courts deem 
statutory meaning “clear” in criminal cases just in virtue of having an “opinion as to 
the best reading,” the attributed stakes could not be any lower. 
That courts regard criminal cases as low-stakes—indeed, the lowest of 
stakes—is somewhat surprising, or at least disappointing, given the special concern 
with criminal conviction embedded in our constitutional and broader legal system.314  
If, for example, criminal conviction “constitutes a formal judgment of [moral] 
condemnation by the community,” imposing “stigma” and causing “damage to the 
defendant’s reputation,”315 then surely greater epistemic caution is called for than when 
adjudicating a generic civil dispute.  Perhaps in an era of mass incarceration, criminal 
conviction truly is run-of-the-mill.316  Still, insofar as courts at least purport to take 
criminal conviction very seriously, it is disconcerting that, in practice, courts attribute 
to criminal cases minimal practical significance.  What this suggests, then, is that, as a 
normative matter, the rule of lenity ought to look much like the avoidance canon, not 
just in form, but also in operation.  If criminal conviction carries with it such significant 
consequences, then it seems that, as an epistemic matter, courts should be much more 
hesitant to declare criminal statutes “clear.”  This is not to claim that all criminal cases 
are high stakes—whether, for example, some class of criminals is subject to a 10-year, 
as opposed to a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence is perhaps not the most pressing 
                                                          
312 Id.  Justice Kagan also questioned Justice Sotomayor’s analogy between the language at issue and the 
chapter of the federal criminal code pertaining to “Sexual Abuse,” observing that, unlike the state-law 
predicate offense language, the federal chapter divides “sexual abuse” into four categories: “aggravated 
sexual abuse,” “sexual abuse,” “sexual abuse of a ward or minor,” and “abusive sexual contact.”  Id. at 
975-76. 
313 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2017). 
314 See Hrafn Asgeirsson, On the Possibility of Non-Literal Legislative Speech, in PRAGMATICS AND LAW: 
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES *1, *20-21 (Alessandro Capone & Francesca Poggi eds., 
forthcoming) (arguing that, generally speaking, the practical stakes of criminal law cases are “fairly 
high”). 
315 Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 373 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
316 See, e.g., ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING 
OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2016); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010). 
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of issues.317  The claim here instead is just that, contrary to current practice, criminal 
cases ought not to be regarded as having as low of stakes as imaginable.318 
 
D. Chevron 
 
 Like the rule of lenity, the so-called Chevron doctrine is a rule for resolving 
statutory unclarity.  Pursuant to that doctrine, a court is, famously, to defer to an 
agency’s reasonable construction of a statute it administers unless, as to the “precise 
question at issue,” statutory meaning is “clear”319  The standard justification for so 
deferring is equal parts democratic and technocratic.  Unclear statutory language, the 
Court has reasoned, leaves in “gaps” in the law that need to be filled, and filling those 
gaps inevitably “involves difficult policy choices.”320  And because agencies are both 
more democratically accountable321 and more technically expert than courts,322 it makes 
sense for courts to defer to them on “how best to construe” indeterminate language 
“in light of competing policy interests.”323  Based on these considerations, courts 
attribute to Congress the—concededly fictional324— intention to delegate to agencies 
rather than to courts the authority to resolve such unclarity.325 
 In recent years, various judges and justices, principally on the right side of the 
political spectrum, have hinted or outright declared that Chevron should be 
reconsidered.  Justice Thomas, for example, has argued that relying upon agencies to 
resolve statutory unclarity violates the separation of powers.326  Drawing on the work 
                                                          
317 Nor is it to suggest that all criminal cases are created equal.  Surely some criminal cases are higher 
stakes than others (e.g., cases involving the applicability of severe penalties).  In turn, one would expect 
courts to apply the rule of lenity more or less aggressively depending upon the stakes of the particular 
case. 
318 Cf. Adam M. Samaha, Low Stakes and Constitutional Interpretation, 13 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 305, 319 
(2010) (reminding that a “low-stakes decision” is not “zero-stakes decision”). 
319 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (“[T]he court, as 
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).  See 
also Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009) 
(explaining that an agency’s interpretation is “reasonable” so long as it is among “the set of 
interpretations which the statute does not clearly prohibit”). 
320 Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005). 
321 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (observing that judges “have no constituency” and “have a duty to respect 
legitimate policy choices made by those who do”). 
322 See Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2726 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Far more than courts, 
agencies have the expertise and experience necessary to design regulatory processes suited to ‘a technical 
and complex arena.’” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863)). 
323 City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2013). 
324 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516-17; 
but see Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, supra note 91, at 1022-31 (arguing that all 
attributions of legislative intent are fictional in character, but that such attributions are evaluable as apt 
or inapt nonetheless). 
325 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. 
326 See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2148 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of 
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of Phillip Hamburger, Justice Thomas has asserted that “the judicial power, as 
originally understood, requires a court to exercise its independent judgment in 
interpreting and expounding upon the laws.”327  And because “[t]hose who ratified the 
Constitution knew that legal texts would often contain ambiguities,” a court’s 
obligation includes “resolv[ing] these ambiguities over time.”328  Deploying less heavy 
artillery,329 Justice Scalia, in some of his later administrative law opinions, appeared to 
suggest that deferring to an agency construction of an agency-administered statute is 
inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA’s) instruction that a 
“reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret ... statutory 
provisions.”330  Though Justice Scalia went on to assure that Chevron “at least was in 
conformity with the long history of judicial review of executive action,”331 others such 
as Aditya Bamzai have called that historical claim into question.332 
 Assessing the merits of these critiques goes beyond the scope of this Article.333  
Here, instead, the thing to observe is that what a court makes of these critiques—as 
well as the doctrine’s justification—is likely to affect, for purely epistemic reasons, how 
freely it defers to agencies under the current regime.  Start with the determination 
whether the Chevron framework applies to the dispute in question, so-called Chevron 
Step Zero.334  As first articulated, Chevron appeared a generic framework for disputes 
involving agency-administered statutes.335  Over time, however, courts indicated a 
willingness to sort among administrative law disputes by type,336 considering whether, 
for example, the Chevron framework applied to disputes concerning an agency’s 
                                                          
Am. Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1241-45 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); Perez v. Mortg. 
Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217-20 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). 
327 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1217-18 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (citing PHILLIP HAMBURGER, LAW 
AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2004)); see also PHILLIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 
(2014). 
328 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1217 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). 
329 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2017) (criticizing the deployment of “heavy constitutional artillery” against the doctrine 
that courts should defer to reasonable agency constructions of unclear regulations). 
330See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706). 
331 Id. 
332 Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908 (2016).  
Bamzai urges that the “most natural reading” of the APA is that it restores what he terms the 
“traditional” approach to deference to agencies.  Id. at 987.  On that approach, courts ‘defer’ to an 
agency’s construction only if “contemporaneous” with the enactment of the statute at issue, or reflective 
of the “customary” interpretation thereof.   Id. at 916.  As Bamzai points out, neither of these grounds 
for deferring to executive agencies is “because they [a]re executive as such.”  Id. at 941. 
333 For a forceful rejoinder, see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural 
Aims of Administrative Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 41. 
334 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001); see 
also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). 
335 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 324, at 511 (characterizing Chevron as “announc[ing] the principle that the 
courts will accept an agency’s reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous terms of a statute that the 
agency administers”). 
336 Courts have never gone so far as to adopt Justice Breyer’s recommended approach of determining 
Chevron’s applicability case-by-case, at least not explicitly.  See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions 
of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 397-98 (1986); see also Scalia, supra note 324, at 516 
(characterizing pre-Chevron as adhering to a case-by-case approach to deference).  
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jurisdiction337 or ones involving questions of “deep ‘economic and political 
significance.’”338  In each instance, the question presented was whether Congress 
would really intend to delegate to agencies rather than to courts the authority to make 
decisions of this type.339  So characterized, one can see how a court’s (or an individual 
judge’s or justice’s) receptiveness to Step Zero arguments might be affected, for purely 
epistemic reasons, by its attitude toward Chevron in general: To the extent that a court 
(or individual judge or justice) regards deferring to agencies as constitutionally dubious, 
that court would reasonably demand heightened epistemic justification before acting 
on the premise that Congress intends to delegate such decisionmaking authority to 
agencies over some class of disputes.  By contrast, if a court (or individual judge or 
justice) does not share that worry, it would require only ordinary epistemic justification 
before acting on that premise. 
 Turn next to the determination whether Congress has spoken “clearly” in an 
individual case.  Here, the epistemic situation reverses.  For Chevron proponents—
unmoved by Hamburger-ian critiques and persuaded by supporting democratic and 
technocratic arguments—the risky premise upon which to act is that Congress has 
answered the “precise question at issue.”  To explain: It is common ground among 
proponents and detractors of deference that “law” gives out at some point, after which 
there are questions of “policy.”340  For proponents of deference, or at least strong 
proponents of deference, the worrisome prospect is less of agencies exercising judicial 
authority than of courts making policy in complex areas absent technical competence 
or democratic mandate.341  Given that concern, it makes sense for strong proponents 
to require increased epistemic justification before acting on the premise that Congress 
has spoken “clearly” on a particular question.  By contrast, for those not disturbed by 
prospect of judicial policymaking, ordinary epistemic justification should suffice 
before acting on the premise that “law” settles the dispute at issue. 
 Whether this is how things play out in practice is tough to assess.  Chief Justice 
Roberts, a consistent critic of Chevron, has also been a consistent vote in favor of 
                                                          
337 City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
338 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. 
Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)). 
339 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (“[H]ad Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely 
would have done so expressly.”). 
340 See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Common Law (reviewing JOHN DICKINSON, 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (2004)), NEW 
RAMBLER REV. (2016). 
341 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 
2580 (2006) (“Chevron is best taken as a vindication of the realist claim that resolution of statutory 
ambiguities often calls for judgments of policy and principle. … The meaning of statutory enactments 
is no brooding omnipresence in the sky.   Chevron is our Erie, and much of the time, it is emphatically 
the province and duty of the executive branch to say what the law is.”); see also ADRIAN VERMEULE, 
JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 217 
(2006) (arguing that the best “justification for Chevron is simply that judicial deference to agencies 
produces better consequences than nondeference”).  Indeed, one way to characterize the spectrum of 
support for deference to agencies is according to the relative concern assigned to those two prospects. 
50 
 
restrictions on Chevron’s domain.342  On the other hand, Justice Thomas, the Court’s 
most vocal critic of Chevron as of late,343 has been less reliable on that front.344  As to 
so-called Step One determination, i.e. determinations whether statutory meaning is 
“clear,”345 the suggestion above might seem to run contrary to Justice Scalia’s 
observation that those “who find[] more often … that the meaning of a statute is 
apparent” are more likely to think Chevron “desirable.”346   That remark, however, had 
to do with propensity to see “apparent” meaning in general, something Justice Scalia 
attributed a judge’s interpretive methodology.347  Holding interpretive methodology 
constant, it is hard to tell whether a distaste for Chevron correlates with finding “clear” 
meaning at Step One.348 
 Data aside, whether the epistemological insight discussed in this Article 
recommends more or less deference to agencies thus turns on what, in a court’s view, 
makes a decision whether to defer ‘high-stakes.’  If the major worry is exercise by the 
executive branch of judicial authority, deference will seem appropriate even less often.  
If, on the other hand, the more pressing concern is judge-made communications or 
environmental policy, deference will appear proper all the more. 
 
 
                                                          
342 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (holding that the Chevron framework does not apply to questions of deep 
economic and political significance); City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1877-86 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Chevron framework should not apply to “jurisdictional” constructions). 
343 Compare Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2148 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(calling for Chevron to be reconsidered) with Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 967 (2005) (Thomas, J.) (holding that a reasonable agency construction 
of a statute it administers supersedes any prior judicial construction). 
344 See City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874-75 (holding that the Chevron framework applies to 
“jurisdictional” constructions). 
345 E.g., Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982-83; see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 334, at 834 (characterizing 
Chevron as establishing a “two-step deference regime”); but see Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 319 
(arguing that Chevron’s two “steps” logically reduce to one). 
346 Scalia, supra note 324, at 521. 
347 Id. (contrasting “strict constructionalist[s]” with those who “abhor[] a ‘plain meaning’ rule, and [are] 
willing to permit the apparent meaning of a statute to be impeached by the legislative history”).  In 
effect, Justice Scalia’s claim was that support for Chevron is inversely proportional to the frequency with 
which one thinks the doctrine would make a difference.  Empirical studies provide moderate support 
for Justice Scalia’s observation.  See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 
An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823, 828-29 (2006) (finding that 
“conservative” justices vote to validate agency decisions less often than “liberal” justices, noting that 
“as an empirical matter, the more conservative justices (Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas) 
have embraced ‘plain meaning’ approaches and the more liberal justices have not”). 
348 As an empirical matter, this question is complicated by, for example, Justice Thomas’s shifting 
assessment of Chevron.  See supra notes 326-328 and accompanying text.  Although Justice Scalia and 
Justice Thomas were consistently similar in terms of interpretive methodology, whether or at what point 
their respective attitudes towards Chevron diverged is unclear, making a meaningful side-by-side 
comparison difficult if not impossible. 
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IV. CODA: ON CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
 
 As David Strauss and others have noted, courts adhere to constitutional text 
much less closely than they do to the text of statutes.349  As with statutory 
interpretation, courts insist that where constitutional text is “clear” or “unambiguous,” 
the text controls.350  At the same time, pursuant to Chief Justice Marshall’s famous 
reminder that “it is a constitution we are expounding,”351 courts frequently construe 
constitutional text in ways that would be unimaginable in the modal statutory case.  To 
give two examples, courts agree that the First Amendment applies to all branches of 
government despite the text instructing that “Congress shall pass no law ….”352  
Similarly, courts accept that the Constitution bars suits in federal court by private 
citizens against their home state353—this notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment’s 
reference to suits “commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”354 
Given the inherently high-stakes nature of constitutional interpretation, one 
might think that the epistemological insight discussed in this Article helps to explain 
(or at least justify) the disparate treatment of constitutional text just described.355  For 
reasons that Strauss articulates, however, it is hard to believe that courts are really 
trying to read the constitutional text.  First, claims like that “Congress,” as used in the 
First Amendment, is a synecdoche referring to all branches of the federal 
government356 are so at odds with ordinary norms of interpretation that, if true, would 
seem to entail interpretive skepticism (to borrow Justice Scalia’s phrasing, if 
“Congress” can mean all branches of government, the “[w]ords no longer have 
meaning”357).358  Second, as Strauss observes, in the modal constitutional decision, 
constitutional text serves at most a “ceremonial role,” with “the serious analysis 
                                                          
349 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 42, at 3 (identifying various “anomalies,” i.e. “outcomes that are 
inconsistent with established principles of constitutional law,” “that following the text of the 
Constitution would produce”); John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise 
Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663 (2004) (discussing the disparity between the constitutional text 
and the Supreme Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence). 
350 See id. at 21 (observing that “it is not acceptable explicitly to ignore the text of the Constitution”); see 
also William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015) (arguing that courts rarely 
if ever “explicitly repudiate” the original meaning of constitutional provisions). 
351 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
352 U.S. CONST. amen. I (emphasis added). 
353 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 1 (1890). 
354 U.S. CONST. amen. XI (emphasis added). 
355 Cf. Christopher R. Green, Constitutional Theory and the Activismometer: How to Think About Indeterminacy, 
Restraint, Vagueness, Executive Review, and Precedent, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 403, 430-32 (2014) 
(articulating a conception of “judicial activism” that reflects the “interest-sensitivity” of knowledge). 
356 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 34 (2012). 
357 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
358 See Strauss, supra note 42, at 30-34 (observing, among other things, that “[t]he other provisions [of 
the Bill of Rights] refer to the ‘right’ of the people or of an individual, or they simply say that certain 
actions are not allowed”). 
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focus[ing] on the precedents.”359  In Strauss’s view, courts’ inattention to constitutional 
text suggests that constitutional “interpretation” is really something like common law 
adjudication, with constitutional text “treated in more or less the same way as 
precedents in a common law system.” 360   
Whatever courts are doing with constitutional text, it seems plain that what 
they are not doing is attending to linguistic nuance.  But if constitutional 
“interpretation” is, as Strauss suggests, a misnomer,361 it is highly doubtful that the 
connection between epistemological and practical reason discussed here sheds any 
light on courts’ treatment of constitutional text vis-à-vis statutory text.  Perhaps if 
courts did care what the Constitution says, their ability to identify constitutional 
meaning definitively would be limited by the would-be heightened practical stakes of 
that task.362  On the other hand, perhaps discerning constitutional meaning would be 
easier in some cases rather than others, owed not just to differences in textual clarity,363 
but also to differences in the practical stakes.364  Regardless, because it is so speculative 
to imagine what our constitutional order would look like if constitutional adjudication 
consisted of careful reading, speculating about the implications of contemporary 
epistemology for that would-be practice is not especially useful at this stage. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This Article is not so naïve as to suggest that all loose treatment of statutory 
text is attributable to epistemological hurdles.  Sometimes politics trumps text, right 
or wrong.  What this Article claims, more modestly, is that, as an epistemological 
matter, there are limits to what one can reasonably expect of courts in high-stakes 
                                                          
359 See Strauss, supra note 42, at 8. 
360 Id. at 4-5 (arguing that constitutional text is constitutional text is “expanded, limited, qualified, 
reconceived, relegated to the background, or all-but-ignored, depending on what comes afterward”; see 
also DAVID A. STRAUSS THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (articulating a common law theory of 
constitutional adjudication).  For an alternative, more eclectic non-originalist account, see, e.g., Mitchell 
N. Berman & Kevin Toh, Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and the Combinability Problem, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1739 
(2013) (suggesting that an array of non-linguistic factors help to determine constitutional law). 
361 To the extent that “interpretation” is an inherently linguistic task.  But see Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin 
Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 
546-50 (2013) (arguing that the phrase “constitutional interpretation” could refer either to the task of 
discerning the constitutional text’s linguistic meaning or to that of determining the text’s legal 
significance). 
362 Seemingly, the heightened practical stakes of judicial review would push in favor of a Thayerian 
approach to constitutional interpretation.  See generally James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893) (recommending a highly deferential approach 
to judicial review). 
363 See Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint, supra note 15, at 1287 (observing the relative clarity of 
numeric constitutional provisions). 
364 See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. 
L. REV. 657 (2011) (arguing that “[t]he constitutional text is quite specific on many low-stakes issues, 
where agreement is more important to most political actors than achieving any particular outcome”). 
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cases.365  Happily, courts seem committed for the most part to following statutory text 
where “clear.”  Courts can only do so, however, if it is epistemologically feasible.  And, 
for the reasons this Article explains, it is simply harder to “know” what a statute means 
when the practical stakes are raised.  Again, this is not to say that it is impossible to 
discern statutory meaning in high-stakes cases, just that to do so is more difficult.  The 
purpose of this Article is thus not to excuse all deviations from text in big cases.  It is, 
instead, to recommend a bit more sympathy—and hence, a bit less cynicism—as the 
Court goes about its work at the end of Term. 
 
                                                          
365 As a corollary, this Article suggests we ought to have more modest expectations of Congress when 
drafting high-stakes legislation.  Assuming that it is more “costly” for Congress to draft precise 
legislative text, see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 75, 103 
(1983) (arguing that the costs associated with legislating precisely often leads legislatures to adopt “open-
ended language”), an entailment of the observation here is that it is more difficult for Congress to speak 
“clearly” when drafting legislation that is inherently high-stakes. 
